[It’s true that Maoist Chairman
Pushpa Kamal Dahal did not handle the overall peace process, and more
specifically the issue of integration very well. Prolonged vacillation
between peace and revolt, his tall promises to PLA combatants that he knew were
impossible to fulfill, and his underestimation of the resentment growing among
their rank and file, have all contributed to the present anarchy in the
cantonments. But without this man’s commitment, especially during this critical
phase and at this crunch time, to seeing the peace process through — one could
well argue that he didn’t have any choice— things might have taken a nasty
turn. No one else has risked as much as Dahal in bringing the peace process to
a seemingly dramatic end. It will take a few more days before the curtain
finally comes down but we want to extend our thanks to Chairman Dahal for the
role he has played in winding up that whole process and give him due credit.]
Not so long ago the Nepal Army (NA) and the PLA were at
war and hence enemy to each other, or that at least was how one referred to
the other. Since the formal end of the fighting and the signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2006, the two armies remained in
separate camps and under the separate chains of command of their respective
institutions. That state of affairs came abruptly to an end on Tuesday as the
NA took control of the seven PLA cantonment sites along with the combatants
and their arms, as per the decision of the Special Committee chaired by Prime
Minister and Maoist Vice-chairman Baburam Bhattarai. From now onwards, the
PLA will remain under the control of the national army until the combatants
either choose to retire voluntarily and leave the cantonments or join the NA
through integration.
The dramatic handover of cantonments to the NA was precipitated by no less dramatic events that were unfolding across the cantonments: Tensions that had been simmering there for weeks, even months, morphed into chaos and confrontation in the last few days. In several cantonments, the combatants, who had so faithfully followed the PLA chain-of-command, dutifully taking orders from their commanders, had suddenly gone ‘berserk’, questioning and challenging those very commanders and even engaging them in physical confrontation.
At the PLA’s First Division at Chulachuli, Ilam, things
escalated out of control, forcing the PLA commanders to flee and seek protection of the Armed Police Force. Faced with the prospect of violence
flaring in the cantonments, the Maoist leadership took a desperate measure,
proposing to send in NA personnel to restore order. The Special Committee’s
decision to hand over the cantonments, containers and combatants to the NA
immediately, though it has come about under desperate circumstances, is a
wise one. Allowing chaos to rein among the PLA could have triggered violence
and even seizure of the arms sealed up in the containers, and that would have
been a huge setback not just for the Maoist leadership but for all those who
have worked and wished so hard to see the peace process conclude.
It’s true that Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal did not handle the overall peace process, and more specifically the issue of integration very well. Prolonged vacillation between peace and revolt, his tall promises to PLA combatants that he knew were impossible to fulfill, and his underestimation of the resentment growing among their rank and file, have all contributed to the present anarchy in the cantonments. But without this man’s commitment, especially during this critical phase and at this crunch time, to seeing the peace process through — one could well argue that he didn’t have any choice— things might have taken a nasty turn. No one else has risked as much as Dahal in bringing the peace process to a seemingly dramatic end. It will take a few more days before the curtain finally comes down but we want to extend our thanks to Chairman Dahal for the role he has played in winding up that whole process and give him due credit. | |||
A Republica Editorial |
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[The combatants were unhappy
especially with the provisions in the seven-point deal on education, age,
rank and the role of the proposed NA directorate. Even after the deal, the
Maoist leadership kept on promising that, irrespective of whatever was
written in the deal, the combatants´ current level of education would be
taken into consideration, there would be group entry into the Nepal Army, the
proposed directorate under the Nepal Army would have a combat role and PLA
commanders would make it to the higher ranks in the Nepal Army--at least to
the level of Brigadier General. None of those promises materialized in the
end as the combatants were never a part of the seven-point deal, and they
felt let down, even cheated, by their leaders. ]
By Kiran Pun
KATHMANDU, April 11: Apparent implosion in the cantonments has forced the
Maoist leadership to resort to the desperate step of sending in the Nepal
Army to take control of the cantonments, combatants and arms containers.
But the implosion did not happen overnight. Nor did it happen for no reason. There was long-simmering frustration and resentment in the cantonments and this initially seemed to be more due to lack of progress in the peace process. Having lived in the cantonments for so many years under physically taxing conditions, the combatants still had no idea how much longer they had to endure cantonment life. All that changed last November when the political parties signed the famous seven-point agreement to conclude the peace process. The points agreed in the seven-point deal did not meet the popular expectations of the combatants, nor were they in line with what the Maoist leadership had promised them. The combatants were unhappy especially with the provisions in the seven-point deal on education, age, rank and the role of the proposed NA directorate. Even after the deal, the Maoist leadership kept on promising that, irrespective of whatever was written in the deal, the combatants´ current level of education would be taken into consideration, there would be group entry into the Nepal Army, the proposed directorate under the Nepal Army would have a combat role and PLA commanders would make it to the higher ranks in the Nepal Army--at least to the level of Brigadier General. None of those promises materialized in the end as the combatants were never a part of the seven-point deal, and they felt let down, even cheated, by their leaders. The combatants were also frustrated over the lack of any schemes for the future of injured combatants, women combatants with offpsring and disqualified combatants. They had gone so far as to obstructed the retirement process in February, pressing their demands. Meanwhile, there were two parallel developments in the Maoist party and at the cantonments, that further complicated matters. First, the growing rift in the Maoist party between the establishment faction led by Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal and Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai and the hardline faction led by Vice-chairman Mohan Baidya began to be reflected in the cantonments also. Combatants belonging to the Baidya group declined to opt for integration in the army and instead chose voluntary retirement as requested by the hardline faction. Maoist Vice-chairman Baidya and General Secretary Ram Bahadur Thapa had issued a joint press statement asking the combatants to reject “unequal” integration and opt instead for voluntary retirement. This created immediate divisions within the PLA rank and file. The second, and perhaps more damaging, development was growing calls for transparency over the PLA fund. The PLA fund possibly comprised billion of rupees but this money was not properly accounted for. So the combatants started demanding details. The PLA fund mostly comprised money amassed from three sources. The first was the Rs 1,000 collected from each combatant every month with a promise that half the money would go to the Young Communist League and the combatants would get the rest at the time of their retirement. When the combatants demanded the money back no clearcut answer was forthcoming from the commanders. Secondly, thousands of combatants had left the cantonments at different times but the PLA continued to draw salaries and allowances in the name of the absentee combatants. These possibly amounted to over a billion rupees also. This money was not accounted for either. Thirdly, the PLA regularly took commissions from contractors supplying rations to the 19,000 plus combatants. This commission money possibly amounted to another billion. The Maoist leadership initially promised the combatants that the status of the PLA fund would be made public, but this never happened. Meanwhile, several combatants had their checks seized by their commanders after the former decided to opt for voluntary retirement during the first round of combatants survey. That created a furor in the cantonments. There were confrontations at the Ilam, Shaktikhor and Surkhet cantonments between retiring combatants and their commanders. "Objectively speaking, the disorder in the organization commenced following the release of those who opted for voluntary retirement. Earlier, the PLA was united by emotion, ideology and organization. But none of that exits any longer,” said Shyam Kumar Budha Magar, a brigade commissar, adding, “Thank god, they have not raised arms so far." Things seem to have reached a tipping point when the combatants realized that they were being forced to either retire or join the Nepal Army without any clarity concerning standard norms, education or the army rank that they would get. Many combatants also complained that there was nepotism and favoritism in the selection of those who would join the army. | |
