[With a president who ran for office almost never having talked about the war, a coterie of political advisers who bitterly oppose deeper American engagement in it, and a national security team dominated by generals worried about the consequences if the United States does not act quickly, the decision could succeed in buying time for Mr. Trump and his advisers to fully deliberate over what to do in Afghanistan.]
By
Mark Landler and Michael R. Gordon
Instead,
the Pentagon issued a news release late one afternoon last week confirming that
the president had given the defense secretary, Jim Mattis, the authority to
send several thousand additional troops to a war that, in its 16th year, engages
about 8,800 American troops.
Mr.
Trump, who writes avidly on Twitter about war and peace in other parts of the
world, said nothing about the announcement. But its effect was unmistakable: He
had outsourced the decision on how to proceed militarily in Afghanistan to the Pentagon, a startling break with how
former President Barack Obama and many of his predecessors handled the
anguished task of sending Americans into foreign conflicts.
The
White House played down the Pentagon’s vaguely worded statement, which referred
only to setting “troop levels” as a stopgap measure — a tacit admission of the
administration’s internal conflicts over what to do about the deteriorating
situation in Afghanistan .
With
a president who ran for office almost never having talked about the war, a
coterie of political advisers who bitterly oppose deeper American engagement in
it, and a national security team dominated by generals worried about the
consequences if the United States does not act quickly, the decision could
succeed in buying time for Mr. Trump and his advisers to fully deliberate over
what to do in Afghanistan.
But
former commanders and military scholars said that in sending troops before
having a strategy, Mr. Trump has put the cart before the horse, eroded the
tradition of civilian control over the military, and abdicated the president’s
duty to announce and defend troop deployments.
“A
commander in chief keeps control of limited wars by defining missions, selecting
commanders and setting troop levels,” said Karl W. Eikenberry, a retired
lieutenant general who was a top commander and the American ambassador in Afghanistan . “To delegate any of these is dangerous.”
The
decision to send additional troops represents at least a temporary victory for
Mr. Mattis and Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, the national security adviser, over Mr.
Trump’s aides, including his chief strategist, Stephen K. Bannon, who had
warned that sending more troops was a slippery slope toward nation building, anathema
to nationalists like him who reject both the interventionist neoconservatives
of the George W. Bush administration and the limited war fought by Mr. Obama.
Those
objections stymied the troop proposal several weeks ago. But officials said the
White House was rattled by a huge truck bomb in Kabul, the Afghan capital, that
killed more than 150, as well as by fears that military trends are running
against the government of President Ashraf Ghani, an American-friendly former
World Bank official, to the point that it might be in danger of collapse.
General
McMaster — who served in Afghanistan as the head of an anti-corruption task
force and is closely allied with Mr. Mattis, another former general with
Afghanistan experience — argued passionately to Mr. Trump that the military
effort had to be expanded without further delay, according to one official.
“What
we are seeing now is that the president has acknowledged that the Afghan
mission is important, and we ought to do it right,” said James Jay Carafano, a
national security specialist at the conservative Heritage Foundation who
advised Mr. Trump’s presidential transition.
White
House officials say they are still debating America ’s role in Afghanistan — one senior adviser said they would
consider issues as basic as whether the country needs a strong central
government, rather than the warlords who have historically divided power there.
In the meantime, the Pentagon is moving ahead with plans to send 3,000 to 5,000
troops to try to stabilize the country.
But
it is not clear what Mr. Trump’s view of the strategy is, or even how involved
he is in the debate. Officials said he did attend two National Security Council
meetings last week — the first to discuss the troop issue, and the second to
discuss the broader policy for South
Asia .
Mr.
Trump has said virtually nothing about Afghanistan since he was elected, or even since he
started his campaign. But his views on the issue, based on Twitter posts when
he was a private citizen, are uniformly hostile to America ’s involvement in the war.
“It
is time to get out of Afghanistan ,” Mr. Trump wrote in 2012. “We are building
roads and schools for people that hate us. It is not in our national interests.”
Even
Mr. Mattis has acknowledged that more troops will not be sufficient without a
broader strategy, which the White House does not plan to complete before mid-July.
Among the major questions are how to deal with the sanctuaries that the Taliban
and other militants still have in neighboring Pakistan , how to fight Afghanistan ’s endemic corruption, and how to encourage a
political settlement with the Taliban.
“The
3,000 to 5,000 may prevent a near-term backsliding, but it is not going to be
decisive in turning the tide of this war,” said Michèle A. Flournoy, the top
Pentagon policy official during the Obama administration. “The administration
needs to accompany any troop increase with a new political and economic
strategy to help the Afghans achieve greater stability.”
Some
experts noted that Mr. Trump’s hands-off approach on troop numbers was squarely
in the Republican tradition of avoiding anything perceived as micromanaging the
military, a criticism frequently leveled at Mr. Obama. But the Pentagon has
assumed an even more outsize role in this administration, given a chaotic White
House staff and an impulsive, preoccupied president.
“The
president doesn’t have the time or interest to make these decisions, so they
want to leave the decision-making to Mattis,” said Richard H. Kohn, a military
historian at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill who advised
General McMaster on his doctoral thesis. “They trust Mattis because he’s got
the expertise and common sense.”
On
Friday, the Pentagon said Mr. Mattis had not yet made a decision on the precise
troop increase. Any decision will come only after the Pentagon consults with
other government agencies, the Afghan government and NATO allies, a spokeswoman,
Dana W. White, said in a statement, adding, “The secretary will continue to
follow the president’s guidance on our overall strategy.”
In
several days of congressional testimony last week, Mr. Mattis argued that
sending more troops would have multiple benefits. Instead of limiting itself to
advisers at high-level corps headquarters, the United States would have advisers accompany Afghan
brigades in the field, where their mentoring of Afghan troops would be more
effective, he said.
The
advisers would also call in air and artillery, which would enable the United States to expand its firepower on behalf of Afghan
forces. That would more closely resemble what American forces are doing in Iraq and Syria to fight the Islamic State.
“These
are going to be people specifically designed, trained and organized and
equipped to go in and advise them how you take the hill, get them the air
support and artillery support and rocket support that will enable them,” Mr. Mattis
told the House Armed Services Committee.
That
suggested that in addition to advisers, the United States would be sending artillery and surface-to-surface
rocket units, as well as more Special Operations forces.
The
Obama administration initially limited the use of American air power against
the Taliban, hoping to make the Afghan military less dependent on the United States . But since Afghanistan has no real air force, the move resulted in
lost ground and soaring Afghan casualties, prompting Mr. Obama to modify the
policy.
Because
Mr. Obama pushed for a faster troop reduction than some of his commanders had
wanted, the advisory effort has been limited. In February, Gen. John W. Nicholson
Jr., the commander of the American-led force in Afghanistan , said he had a “shortfall of a few thousand”
troops.
About
6,700 American troops are training and advising Afghan forces, including 400
who are outside the country and 2,100 who are involved in counterterrorism
operations. (NATO and other nations have deployed another 6,500 troops for the
training effort.)
“Three
thousand to 5,000 additional advisers and trainers is essential,” John R. Allen,
a retired general who served as the commander in Afghanistan from 2011 to 2013, said in an interview.
When
he served as the commander in Afghanistan, General Allen envisioned a residual
force of 13,600 Americans and 6,000 NATO and other foreign troops — a force
level that would have allowed advisers to be placed at all of the Afghan Army
corps headquarters, to accompany Afghan brigades on some operations, and to set
up a national training center in Helmand Province.
The
White House is calling its strategy a South Asia
policy, to distinguish it from the Obama administration’s so-called Af-Pak
policy. Officials said it would include diplomacy with Pakistan , India and even Iran , a nation that American diplomats cooperated
with during the early months of the Afghan war but that the White House now
sees as a bitter foe.
But
the administration’s efforts to harness diplomacy may be handicapped by the
depleted condition of the State Department. And that suggests to some that
whatever strategy the Trump administration eventually arrives at will be
dominated by the military.
“I
am not against a troop increase,” said Daniel F. Feldman, who served as special
representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan under Mr. Obama. “But this appears to be
tactics waiting for a strategy.”
Julie
Hirschfeld Davis contributed reporting.