[More than a decade of constant fighting has deeply changed the movement that the American-led invasion helped remove from power in 2001. Much of the cadre of fighters that first rose up to battle rapacious warlords during the country’s civil war has been killed or remains in exile. On the ground, the movement now relies on a mixed bag of members, many of whom fight under the banner of the Taliban but bear no resemblance to the spiritual movement of the 1990s.]
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The coffin of Zubair Hatami, a 22-year-old journalist who died
from wounds sustained
in a Taliban attack on a French-run school, was carried in
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Responding to growing complaints, the Talibanleadership
based in Pakistan
Though the episode went largely unnoticed outside the
Taliban stronghold, it highlights a question that is on the minds of many: More
than 13 years after the war here started, who exactly are the Taliban? Are they
the bandits responsible for the abduction and killings of numerous villagers?
Or are they the disciplined leaders who hanged the fighters who had taken to
criminal tyranny?
Increasingly, it appears, they are both.
More than a decade of constant fighting has deeply
changed the movement that the American-led invasion helped remove from power in
2001. Much of the cadre of fighters that first rose up to battle rapacious
warlords during the country’s civil war has been killed or remains in exile. On
the ground, the movement now relies on a mixed bag of members, many of whom
fight under the banner of the Taliban but bear no resemblance to the spiritual
movement of the 1990s.
The significant military gains the Taliban made in the
past year have focused new attention on the group’s character and challenges,
as its leaders try to make the case to Afghans that they are stronger and more
legitimate rulers than the American-backed government.
Some of the Taliban factions pressing their military
goals remain idealists, but many are basically criminals who have used the
Taliban brand to further their lucrative enterprises in the opium trade and
commodity smuggling, Afghan and Western officials say.
Still others have splintered from the mainstream Taliban,
having grown more extreme and less inclined to engage in peace talks. A recent
report from the United Nations Security Council said that much of the movement
was “opposed to reconciliation” with the government, and it said the likelihood
that the Taliban’s core leadership could break the internal stalemate was
“slim.”
“The old Taliban leadership is aging, and they have lost
their ability to exert command and control from Pakistan
Part of the reason is that battlefield losses to the
coalition military campaign have forced a major turnover within the Taliban’s
ranks. Scores of midlevel Taliban commanders have been killed and replaced in
the last decade, leaving a young and more hardened set of field leaders in
their place with less connection to the leadership of Mullah
Muhammad Omar, the reclusive emir of the movement who has not been
spotted since the war started.
“This movement is
heavily fragmented and held together by a piece of string and a prayer,” said
Alex Strick van Linschoten, a researcher and an author of the book “An Enemy We Created:
The Myth of the Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan.” Mr.
van Linschoten added, “Mullah Omar is burdened with all of this weight, and he
is more or less keeping this movement together — or at least the idea of him.”
From the highest levels of the central organization led
by Mullah Omar, known as the Quetta Shura, the group is clearly trying to
signal that it is moving away from some of the hard-line policies and practices
that defined its harsh rule from 1996 to 2001. A spokesman for the group denies
that the kidnappings in Helmand this summer were perpetrated by true Taliban fighters.
In some Afghan areas under Taliban sway, it is not
uncommon to hear stories of a more farsighted governing style. Insurgent
commanders have opened girls’ schools in some places and operate court systems
that are seen as fairer and more effective than the government’s. In some
cases, they attend weddings with music without a word of consternation — once
unthinkable for a group that banned musical instruments and performances. And
the group has been calculatedly aggressive about its publicity campaign on
social media.
In short, some leading Taliban have seized on the need to
capture hearts and minds.
“They have a much more realistic perspective on what
government is now,” said one senior Western diplomat. “They are much more
realistic about things. One thing they learned is that if they want to come
back and take over Afghanistan
“The Afghan people have a lot of expectations now,” the
official added, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the individual
was not authorized to speak publicly on the matter.
But that perspective is not the whole story. Across the
country, villagers living under Taliban control offer a far more complicated
picture. Many feel the Taliban have hardly changed at all. They still inflict
brutal policies in some areas under their control and are merciless with
villagers who cross them. Some refuse to listen to the directives of the Quetta
Shura, going their own way in how they fight and rule.
Even those living in the same district cannot agree on
what is happening. The district governor of Marawara says that the government
controls 75 percent of the area and that the Taliban have been on a charm
offensive to win back popular support. But an elder in the same area says the
exact opposite: that the Taliban control 75 percent of the territory and are
worse than ever.
“There has not been a single percent change in their
ideology,” said Hajji Pacha, an elder from the district. “They are still the
same bastards.”
Some Taliban leaders, including those among the network
of shadow governors that ultimately answers to the Quetta Shura, claim they
have been unfairly saddled with a bad reputation for behavior long since past.
“It is very true
that we used to have many cruel and imprudent people among us who were misusing
their supremacy by harassing ordinary people or beating them,” said Ershad
Zazai, the Taliban shadow governor of the Sarkano district of Kunar
Province
In that respect, the only consistent element of Taliban
intelligence is that there is no consistency. Even Western analysts who study
the group have differing views on its direction, success and cohesion.
Still, many ask how the group could have made the gains
it did this summer — killing a record number of policemen and soldiers — if its
structure is supposedly so incoherent.
One explanation is simply that the gains are explained
more by government weakness than by Taliban strength.
“The officials are not in touch with the local people,”
said Hajji Zahir, an elder in the Marko district of Nangarhar Province, which
has seen a large upswing in violence. “They have closed the door on the people
— the people do not trust them and so the government cannot go out.”
And while much has changed since 2001, there are still
some areas, especially in the Pashtun heartland in the south and east, that
value the Taliban way of life and moral code.
“The Taliban still carries the banner of Islamic morals,”
said another senior diplomat with extensive experience in the country. “The
Taliban still grabs people’s minds. And in a fight about who is right, you must
gain the minds of the people.”
“Afghans are not looking for many things, mostly justice
and security,” the diplomat, who was not authorized to speak publicly, added.
“There is no justice in this government. There is justice under the Taliban.”
Ahmad
Shakib contributed reporting from Kabul Afghanistan Afghanistan
