SINO-INDIA BORDER DISPUTE
[The Doklam crisis ended with mixed results for India. As the Indian Army chief himself admitted in January that, Chinese troops continue to occupy North Doklam, while Indian soldiers have pulled out of it and returned to their outposts in Sikkim. On the positive side, India managed to force China to halt building a road in Doklam, which it was extending southwards, across the Torsa Nala, to its claim line at the Zompelri Ridge, which runs southeast from Mount Gipmochi. Indian military planners believe it essential to enforce Bhutan’s claim line along the Batang La - Sinche La ridgeline, about 12-14 kilometres north of Zompelri Ridge. They worry that Chinese possession of Zompelri would give the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a launching pad to capture the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor – a narrow, 29 kilometre-wide sliver of land, with Nepal on one side and Bangladesh on the other. It connects mainland India with its eight north-eastern states.]
By Ajai Shukla
Last week, an Indian parliamentary panel
fluttered the dovecotes in Thimphu – Bhutan’s idyllic capital – by recommending
New Delhi encourage Bhutan to deploy more soldiers in the disputed Doklam area,
where a year ago several hundred Indian and Chinese soldiers stood
eyeball-to-eyeball, raising real fears of bloodshed.
Non-violent patrol confrontations are common
along the undefined, 4,588 kilometre, Sino-Indian border, but the face-off at
Doklam was unique. Indian soldiers were not defending Indian soil; they had
crossed into Bhutan and claimed to be acting on Thimphu’s behalf, in accordance
with a security treaty between India and Bhutan. For the 73 days that Doklam
smouldered, Thimphu walked on eggshells, balancing between India’s stifling
embrace and the potential consequences from China.
The Doklam crisis ended with mixed results
for India. As the Indian Army chief himself admitted in January that, Chinese troops
continue to occupy North Doklam, while Indian soldiers have pulled out of
it and returned to their outposts in Sikkim. On the positive side, India
managed to force China to halt building a road in Doklam, which it was
extending southwards, across the Torsa Nala, to its claim line at the Zompelri
Ridge, which runs southeast from Mount Gipmochi. Indian military planners
believe it essential to enforce Bhutan’s claim line along the Batang La - Sinche
La ridgeline, about 12-14 kilometres north of Zompelri Ridge. They worry that
Chinese possession of Zompelri would give the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a
launching pad to capture the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor – a narrow, 29
kilometre-wide sliver of land, with Nepal on one side and Bangladesh on the
other. It connects mainland India with its eight north-eastern states.
Thus, in confronting China in Doklam, the
Indian Army was protecting vital Indian interests more than enforcing the
India-Bhutan security pact.
Some Sikkim veterans like Lieutenant General
S L Narasimhan (Retired), who is on India’s National Security Advisory Board,
believe concerns about Siliguri are overblown. Breaking through India’s strong
border defences in Sikkim would require the PLA to mobilise large bodies of
troops, giving India time to reinforce. Chinese troops would have to enter
Doklam through the Chumbi Valley which is overlooked by dominating Indian
positions that would pound the PLA with artillery, air and ground fire. Were
the Chinese attackers to miraculously reach Gipmochi, they would then face the
daunting task of advancing to Siliguri through 80 kilometres of forested
mountains, without artillery or logistic support. Once in Siliguri, the
isolated Chinese spearheads would face massive Indian counter-attacks.
Whatever the logic for Doklam, that
confrontation has exacerbated Thimphu’s concerns about getting sucked into a
Sino-Indian conflict. Bhutanese elites, and increasingly the public, believe
they should settle their border with China, not tack a settlement onto India’s
more intractable dispute. Beijing has offered Thimphu a strategic swap, in
which it will concede to Bhutan disputed territory in the north, in exchange
for Doklam. New Delhi, however, firmly discourages conceding Doklam to China.
A top-level Bhutanese politician told me in
Thimphu: “Since 1984, we have had 25 rounds of boundary talks with China. There
is still no settlement because we also have to take into account India’s
security concerns. But we have to think carefully and get a settlement that is
good for Bhutan.”
India has discouraged Bhutan from opening
diplomatic relations with other countries, particularly with China, encouraging
it instead to conduct diplomatic relations through its embassy in New Delhi.
But now, with China outpacing India economically and militarily and showing its
power through incidents like Doklam, Bhutan’s old elites and new, populist
politicians increasingly worry about having hitched their wagon to the wrong
horse. There is also a popular aspiration across Bhutan to emerge from India’s shadow
and assert sovereignty more tangibly. New Delhi has not handled this aspiration
with sophistication and sensitivity.
This causes resentment across Bhutan.
Responding to Indian criticism of the recent Chinese ministerial visit to
Thimphu, Tenzing Lamsang, Editor of The Bhutanesenewspaper tweeted: “I would
advise Indian media outlets, commentators, think tanks & even policy makers
against such excessive paranoia and speculation. This is what Bhutanese find
irritating & at times even suffocating. You call us your closest friend, so
at least trust us and give us some space.”
It is ironic that Indian assistance, as in
Doklam, has only swelled Bhutanese resentment. India’s Border Roads
Organisation has done much to create a network of roads in Bhutan under its
so-called Project Dantak. But Dantak’s enormous visibility has worked against
it. Last year, public criticism forced Dantak to remove from Paro airport a
large sign saying “Dantak welcomes you to Bhutan.” Last month, Dantak was also
forced to remove road safety reflectors that were in the colours of the Indian
flag. Now there is criticism of Dantak for building roads too expensively.
Similarly, there is criticism across Bhutan
about the hydroelectric power purchase arrangement with India, which has backstopped
economic cooperation between the two countries. So far, the Indian government
has funded the construction of hydel plants in Bhutan and paid Thimphu directly
for the power it purchased. Now, New Delhi wants to delegate responsibility to
its public sector power corporations, which would make decisions based on
economic rather than strategic rationale.
New Delhi must realise that there are few
takers in Bhutan for the logic that India’s military commitment to Bhutan gives
it ownership over Thimphu’s security and economic decision-making. There is the
lurking fear of China, which is unsurprising in a predominantly Buddhist
country. But that is gradually giving way to an even more tangible irritation
at India’s clumsy overlordship.
A former Indian Army colonel, Ajai Shukla is
an analyst and commentator on defence and security affairs
