[Despite a state visit last November during which Trump gushed about the lavish welcome he received and his bond with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, his administration has repeatedly signaled in recent weeks a new cynicism about China ’s role in the world and the threat China represents.]
By Siman Denyer
President
Trump chats with Chinese President Xi Jinping during a welcome ceremony
in
|
The
president’s language in his State of the Union address represented a
fundamental reappraisal of the U.S. relationship with China — one that has been building for years but
has crystallized since Trump took office last year, experts say.
Engagement
— long accepted as the path to a safer world and a freer China — has been replaced with a chillier sense of
strategic competition.
On
Wednesday, China’s Foreign Ministry called on the United States to abandon its
“outdated Cold War mentality,” manage its differences with Beijing and realize
that “win-win” cooperation is the only viable option.
A
Chinese foreign policy scholar called Trump’s language “alarming and
provocative,” while state media warned that “malicious rivalry” and further
enhancement of American military might would only end in disaster.
“Around
the world,” Trump said, “we face rogue regimes, terrorist groups and rivals
like China and Russia that challenge our interests, our economy
and our values. In confronting these horrible dangers, we know that weakness is
the surest path to conflict, and unmatched power is the surest means to our
true and great defense.
Despite
a state visit last November during which Trump gushed about the lavish welcome
he received and his bond with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, his
administration has repeatedly signaled in recent weeks a new cynicism about China ’s role in the world and the threat China represents.
“The
idea of engagement has underpinned the U.S.-China relationship for decades,”
Bill Bishop wrote in his Axios China newsletter. “Now the U.S. government appears to have declared
engagement has failed.”
The
change was spelled out most clearly by the White House in its National Security
Strategy dated December 2017.
“For
decades, U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that support
for China ’s rise and for its integration into the
postwar international order would liberalize China ,” the document says. “Contrary to our hopes,
China expanded its power at the expense of the
sovereignty of others.”
Among
the complaints: that China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled
scale, and that it spreads features of its authoritarian system around the
globe, including corruption and the use of surveillance. At the same time, China is building the most capable and well-funded
military in the world, second only to that of the United States
In
its National Defense Strategy released last month, the Pentagon argued “that
the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence
of long-term, strategic competition by ‘revisionist’ powers.”
“It
is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent
with their authoritarian model — gaining veto authority over other nations’
economic, diplomatic, and security decisions,” the document says.
Specifically,
it calls China a “strategic competitor” that uses predatory
economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing the South China Sea , a region where China claims full sovereignty despite strong
opposition from the United States and its Southeast Asian allies.
And
in a significant reevaluation of the economic relationship, the U.S. trade representative even argued that it had
been a mistake for the United States to support China ’s entry into the World Trade Organization in
2001 “on terms that have proven to be ineffective in securing China ’s embrace of an open, market-oriented trade
regime.”
Daniel
Rosen of the Rhodium Group, long a leading advocate of engagement with China , calls the Trump administration’s position a
“sea change in perceptions of U.S. interests.”
Frustration
with China for not opening its markets further to foreign firms has been
building, and the idea that its entry into the WTO might not have been handled
well has been the subject of dinner-party debate even among executives from
multinational companies here for the past year.
Such
sentiment has been further fueled by the feeling that China is walling itself off from the global
Internet and trying to control cross-border data flows on which businesses
depend.
Domestically,
President Xi has buried the idea that a more prosperous China would ultimately become a more liberal, freer
China : He has ruthlessly used the power of the
state to step up surveillance and crack down on civil society, the legal
profession and any hint of dissent.
Abroad,
Xi makes no secret of his desire for China ’s voice to be heard more clearly on the
world stage: His assertion of maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea and his ambition to spread Chinese influence
through his country’s global Belt and Road investments are just two examples of
a more confident, assertive nation
But
the shift in Chinese attitudes also predates Xi and can be traced back to the
Western financial crisis a decade ago, experts say.
Since
the crisis, the Communist Party has come to believe more strongly that its
economic system offers a better model than that of the West, with markets
allocating some resources but with the party ultimately in control of the
economy.
For
years, engagement with China had made sense, Rosen argued in a recent essay:
China had been gradually converging with Western
norms in its embrace of private enterprise, market forces and foreign
businesses, and in its withdrawal of the state from the economy.
But
those trends have stalled or gone into reverse.
Enter
Trump, a president singularly obsessed with the U.S. trade deficit with China and numbering among his advisers men such as
economist Peter Navarro and Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer, who have
long warned of a threat from Beijing .
Andrew
Polk, a partner at the research firm Trivium China , says the rethinking of engagement has been
a structural trend, “but the conversation has been put on steroids under Trump.”
Nor
is it a conversation being heard only in Washington : In Germany , there are growing concerns about China ’s attempts to divide and conquer the
European Union by wooing its poorer nations. In Australia , there are widely expressed fears of Chinese
interference.
So
far, Trump has not definitively translated his words into action, partly, he
says, because he is seeking China ’s help in isolating North Korea .
But
he imposed import tariffs on solar panels and washing machines last month, and
expected action over intellectual property theft and steel and aluminum imports
has left many here worried about a trade war.
The
possibility of U.S. military action against North Korea , China ’s neighbor and traditional ally, could lead
to a more troubling confrontation involving the world’s most powerful nations
Rosen
wrote that the shift in the U.S. attitude to China will lead to stepped-up confrontation over
trade and investment, but he warned that it will also make it harder for the
two powers to cooperate in areas where they need to find common ground, whether
over North
Korea
or the environment and climate change.
“This
shift in US-China relations is a serious concern,” he wrote. “In a relationship
predicated not on the expectation of convergence but of rivalry and competition,
opportunities for cooperation will be missed.”
Liu
Yang and Amber Ziye Wang contributed to this report.
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