[Mr. Trump had little room to maneuver, given the situation on the ground and the political calculus. No president was going to suggest to a war-weary American public the sort of troop surge that brought force levels to 100,000 in 2010, the peak of the American military’s presence in Afghanistan. But Mr. Trump has also concluded, as do most national security experts, that departing altogether would create a breeding ground for terrorists that threatens the West.]
By
Michael R. Gordon
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American
troops kept watch near the wreckage of their vehicle at the site of a
Taliban suicide
attack in Kandahar, Afghanistan, this month. Credit Javed
Tanveer/Agence
France-Presse — Getty Images
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President Trump’s new strategy for the war in
Afghanistan, which he laid out Monday night in a televised address, is intended
to give a badly needed boost to the campaign to push back the Taliban, step up
the fight against terrorism and reverse the steady deterioration of security
that has allowed devastating bombings to shake Kabul.
The strategy, which would require several
thousand more troops to implement, will likely help, current and former United
States commanders said. It would allow American officers to more closely advise
Afghan brigades, train more Afghan special operations forces and call in
American firepower.
But even those who support Mr. Trump’s strategy
cast his decision as the start of yet another challenging chapter that might,
at best, enable Afghan forces to regain momentum on the battlefield over the
next several years, not a quick fix for the problems that have bedeviled the
region for nearly 16 years.
“I do not think many believe there could be
an outright victory,” said Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, who
has been an advocate of sending more troops to Afghanistan. “But if President
Trump can reverse the momentum, then he could arguably claim bragging rights
and achieve at least a partial strategic success.”
Mr. Trump had little room to maneuver, given
the situation on the ground and the political calculus. No president was going
to suggest to a war-weary American public the sort of troop surge that brought
force levels to 100,000 in 2010, the peak of the American military’s presence
in Afghanistan. But Mr. Trump has also concluded, as do most national security
experts, that departing altogether would create a breeding ground for
terrorists that threatens the West.
The president, who campaigned on pulling back
on American engagement abroad, settled on his strategy as a necessary step to
reverse gains made by the Taliban and to fight terrorism, including the branch
in Afghanistan of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS.
“A hasty withdrawal would create a vacuum for
terrorists, including ISIS and Al Qaeda,” Mr. Trump said Monday night in front
of about 2,000 service members in Fort Myer, Va., near Washington.
But whether the battlefield advances
projected under Mr. Trump’s plan will endure remains an open question.
Sustaining the gains would require greater cooperation from Pakistan, which has
allowed the Taliban and extremist groups to maintain sanctuaries on its
territory, and a more determined effort by Afghan authorities in fighting
corruption and improving governance.
The Trump administration acknowledged as much
on Monday by casting the new troop deployments, expected to be an increase of
as many as 4,000, as part of a new policy for the South Asia region, rather
than Afghanistan alone. But carrying out that strategy will require deft
diplomatic management from a team that is still untested in managing national
security crises.
Sending more troops, however, is a big part
of what American military generals have long argued is needed to help stem
losses in Afghanistan. The United States has 8,400 troops allocated to the
Resolute Support mission to train and advise Afghan forces, far fewer than the
13,600 American troops that retired Gen. John R. Allen, the Afghan commander in
from 2011 to 2013, sought from the Obama administration. Another 2,000
Americans forces are allocated to work with Afghan forces in counterterrorism
missions.
Given such a modest footprint, the nearly 4,000
troops that Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has been authorized to add and
additional reinforcements that have been solicited from NATO and allied nations
make for a noteworthy increase.
“It would begin the process of arresting the
difficulties the Afghans have suffered because we did not have the numbers to
properly train and advise them,” General Allen said in an interview before Mr.
Trump’s announcement.
In addition to the increase in troops, how
they will be deployed is a major factor in whether Mr. Trump’s strategy will
succeed.
Assuming Mr. Mattis sends all of the
additional troops, as expected, the American military will be able to advise
select Afghan brigades in the field instead of trying to mentor them from more
distant headquarters. They can step up the effort to train special operations
forces and, thus, substantially boost the number of Afghan commandos.
They would also enable the United States to
call in air and artillery strikes on behalf of more Afghan units, making
American firepower more effective.
“These are going to be people specifically
designed, trained and organized and equipped to go in and advise them how you
take the hill, get them the air support and artillery support and rocket
support that will enable them,” Mr. Mattis told Congress in June as he laid out
his proposal for the additional forces.
Even if the plan unfolds as designed, the
military itself has argued that still more steps are needed.
Achieving lasting gains will depend heavily
on the Trump administration’s ability to persuade Pakistan to shut down the
sanctuaries that the Taliban and extremist groups like the Haqqani network
enjoy on its territory, a goal that has eluded both Republican and Democratic
administrations.
“No partnership can survive a country’s harboring
of militants and terrorists who target U.S. service members and officials,” Mr.
Trump said. “It is time for Pakistan to demonstrate its commitment to
civilization, order and to peace.”
To bring Pakistan along, Trump administration
officials have been discussing a mix of steps. The United States could reduce
aid, slap sanctions on Pakistani officials and perhaps expand the military’s
authority to conduct airstrikes on Pakistan’s side of the border.
Pakistan, however, is only part of the
problem. The Russians have been talking to the Taliban and, according to
American officials, may be providing material support. The Kremlin’s policy may
be a hedge against the growth of the Islamic State’s influence in Afghanistan,
the possible departure of American forces or simply a way to make life harder
for the Americans. Whatever the Russian motivations, they add to the challenges
in dealing with Moscow and in Afghanistan.
What remains unclear is whether Mr. Trump’s
strategy will pressure the Taliban strongly enough to prompt them to come to
the negotiating table to work out a peace settlement with the Afghan
authorities. The much larger force of 100,000 troops that President Barack
Obama deployed to Afghanistan did not batter the Taliban sufficiently to yield a
diplomatic settlement.
But even if a successful negotiation is not
possible, the Pentagon is likely to argue that stepping up the American effort
in Afghanistan and buttressing the authorities in Kabul will enable the United
States to maintain a platform for conducting counterterrorism operation in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Mr. Trump often talks about the importance of
winning. But as the Afghan war nears the end of its 16th year, not losing may
be the more immediate and achievable objective.
