Washington should welcome New Delhi’s
military strikes on terrorists in Kashmir.
By Sadanand Dhume
 |
|
Indian Army soldiers patrol outside their base
camp in Langate 75 kilometers
(47 miles) north of Srinagar, Indian controlled
Kashmir, India, Thursday,
Oct 6, 2016. The Indian army said Thursday that
its soldiers foiled
an attack on an army camp and killed three
suspected rebels in
Indian-controlled Kashmir. PHOTO: ASSOCIATED
PRESS
|
India last week turned nearly two decades of
Pakistan policy on its head. By announcing attacks on terrorist “launch
pads”—final staging posts for militants before they cross over from the
Pakistan-controlled part of Kashmir to the Indian side—New Delhi signaled a new
pugnaciousness in response to terrorism from across the border, such as the
Sept. 18 attack that killed 19 Indian soldiers at a Kashmir border camp.
In another departure from the past, the U.S.
appeared to back India rather than reflexively call for restraint on both
sides. A White House statement following a phone conversation between National
Security Adviser Susan Rice and her Indian counterpart, Ajit Doval, “strongly
condemned the Sept. 18 cross-border attack” and urged Pakistan to “take
effective action” against terrorist groups, including Jaish-e-Mohammad and
Lashkar-e-Taiba.
The Obama administration is right to
welcome—or at least accept—India’s new toughness. In the short run, an India
that no longer turns the other cheek to violence by Pakistan-based terrorist
groups may worry those who fear instability in the subcontinent. Over time,
however, an India that stands up to terrorism is more likely to anchor South
Asian stability than one that ducks the problem. It will also make a more
reliable partner against both radical Islam and Chinese hegemony in Asia.
The Indian army says it conducted “surgical
strikes” against terrorists at “launch pads along the line of control,” the de
facto border between the Indian and Pakistani parts of Kashmir. The senior
military official who briefed reporters added that the strikes had caused
“significant casualties” to “the terrorists and those who are trying to support
them,” an allusion to the Pakistani army.
Precise details of the operation remain a
mystery. The government has already quashed an overzealous media’s more lurid
speculation, including claims of a helicopter-borne raid modeled on the 2011
U.S. killing of Osama bin Laden. Some anonymous sources paint a more plausible
picture: small teams of Indian special forces crossed on foot up to 3
kilometers inside Pakistan-controlled territory in several places, and killed
an unspecified number of likely terrorists.
For its part, Pakistan says India killed two
of its soldiers, but Islamabad emphatically denies any raid on territory it
controls. On Saturday the Pakistani military took reporters to the line of control
to speak with villagers who denied seeing any Indian soldiers cross over.
No matter which side you believe—and few
serious analysts doubt the broad contours of India’s official claim—the Modi
government’s decision to go public is significant. Instead of treating the line
of control as a de facto border, as it has for decades, India is showing a
willingness to openly breach it for counterterrorism operations. It correctly
reckons that, unlike in the past, international pressure to prevent escalation between
the nuclear-armed neighbors will fall primarily on Pakistan.
In terms of messaging, the strikes appeared
designed to fulfill somewhat contradictory purposes. For a domestic audience
they suggest boldness and embellish Mr. Modi’s muscular image. (The Indian
media’s penchant for chest-thumping exaggeration didn’t hurt.)
For the international community, India
underscores a sense of responsibility and continued restraint. New Delhi has
framed its attack as a limited, pre-emptive strike against terrorists. By
confining its actions to the disputed territory of Kashmir, not targeting
regular Pakistani troops and not using air power, India arguably bent over
backward to ensure that it delivered its message while minimizing the risk of
escalation.
Indeed, though the cross-border strikes
predictably garnered most of the headlines, Mr. Modi has placed diplomacy at
the heart of his response to the Sept. 18 attack. Next month’s scheduled South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation meeting in Islamabad collapsed when
Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Bhutan joined India in pulling out. Bangladesh and
Afghanistan, in particular, share India’s displeasure with Pakistan’s role in
fomenting Islamist radicalism in their countries.
India also said it would move to use its
share of rivers from a 56-year- old water treaty with Pakistan more
effectively, a veiled threat, albeit one with few immediate consequences.
Meanwhile New Delhi is considering rescinding the “most favored nation” trade
status it granted Pakistan 20 years ago, on the grounds that Islamabad is yet
to reciprocate the gesture.
Pakistan won’t abandon its support for
jihadist groups overnight, but at least India has begun to raise the costs of
that support. Over time, this may force the Pakistani army to reconsider its
policies. And if Washington wants New Delhi to play a more active role in East
Asia, it can hardly expect elected Indian governments to ignore their most
pressing security concerns at home.
Mr. Modi has rejigged the old calculus that
made stability in South Asia largely India’s responsibility. If the gamble pays
off by eroding Pakistani support for jihadists, it will make South Asia a safer
region and India a more valuable partner for the West.
Mr. Dhume is a resident fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute and a columnist for WSJ.com.
@ The Wall Street Journal via Facebook
