[The unhappiness of most of the
Madhesi people with this decision, and the rioting that followed the
announcement of the new provinces, has added to India ’s
disquiet, since problems in Nepal
inevitably spill over into India .
It is unofficially estimated that at the height of the Nepalese civil war less
than a decade ago, 7 million of Nepal ’s
27 million people had sought refuge in India
(undocumented, since Nepalese need no passports to come here).]
By Shashi Tharoor
In the United
States of the early 1950s, as Mao’s
Communist party regime consolidated its hold on China
and marched into Tibet ,
exiling Washington ’s favourite
Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-Shek, to the island
of Taiwan , the American strategic
community was convulsed in a debate over “Who Lost China?” I only hope that
nearly seven decades later their Indian equivalents will not be letting out the
anguished cry, “Who Lost Nepal?”
There is, of course, only place
for fingers to be pointed, and that is at our own government in New
Delhi . Despite its increasingly feeble denials, India ’s
de facto blockade of Nepal
has choked the country’s economy, cut off its oil supplies, caused genuine
hardship and provoked a groundswell of hostility against our country – from the
one place on the planet whose relationship with us is so fraternal that we
maintain open borders with it.
How did this come to pass, and
why? India ’s
displeasure at Nepal ’s
new Constitution, and its refusal to accommodate the desires of its Madhesi and
Tharu population, is understandable. The people of the Terai (or the Madhes, as
Indians prefer to call the region south of the hills abutting our border) are
in many ways kin to – and essentially indistinguishable from – their brethren
on our side of the frontier.
Here’s my take on how a
centralised Modi regime succeeded in alienating Nepal :
Snapshot: Uneasy Ties
* When the Constitution-makers in Kathmandu
went ahead, India
reacted with a pique unbecoming of a major regional power.
Madhesis as a Minority
Map
of
|
Some Nepalis consider them to be
essentially transplanted Biharis, but they have been there for centuries and
more, and no one contests their legitimate claim to an honoured role in shaping
Nepal ’s
political destiny. But rather than choosing an inclusive path by giving them
their own autonomous regions or provinces, the new Constitution essentially
renders them a minority in almost every province bar one (see map).
The unhappiness of most of the
Madhesi people with this decision, and the rioting that followed the
announcement of the new provinces, has added to India ’s
disquiet, since problems in Nepal
inevitably spill over into India .
It is unofficially estimated that at the height of the Nepalese civil war less
than a decade ago, 7 million of Nepal ’s
27 million people had sought refuge in India
(undocumented, since Nepalese need no passports to come here).
If the anger in the Terai leads
to a separatist movement, for instance, India
will likely bear the brunt of a new refugee crisis. New
Delhi felt, understandably, that Kathmandu ’s
leadership, overwhelmingly composed of the dominant hill elites, should have
taken India ’s
concerns into account before announcing a Constitution so fraught with
potential problems.
Profound Resentment
But it’s a far cry from feeling
fraternal concern about a vital neighbour making a major political error, and
manifesting that irritation through virtually cutting off that country’s
lifeline from our country, thereby giving rise to profound resentment of what
is justifiably portrayed as Big Brother’s bullying. The suspicion that in doing
so the BJP government is pandering to voters in Bihar ’s
ongoing assembly polls is not entirely unfounded.
The fact is there’s enough blame
to be cast on our side too. The foreign secretary was sent as a special envoy
to warn Katmandu not to embark on a
negative course, but that was just days before the Constitution was promulgated
and after it had already been agreed among all the major national political
parties. The time for discreet but strong-arm diplomacy was months earlier, when
the signs were apparent that the Constitution was likely not to be the
inclusive one India
had hoped for.
Our foreign secretary is an
outstandingly able diplomat, but he is no Nepal
expert and has never served there. A political envoy, or an all-party team of
Indian political leaders with well-established contacts in that country, should
have been dispatched before the summer with a clear and unambiguous message of
the importance India
attached to a formula acceptable to all shades of Nepali opinion.
Warnings Ignored
I have reason to believe our
embassy, led by the excellent Ambassador Ranjit Rae, read the warning signs in
time and sent urgent messages to New Delhi
calling for early diplomatic intervention. These were ignored. One astute
observer told me privately that “PMO took its eyes off the ball”. But when
decision-making has been so centralised in the Modi regime that every ministry
has to send its important files to the PMO for clearance, how many balls can
Modi and his beleaguered minions keep their eyes on?
That was the Modi government’s
first mistake. By the time it woke up to the impending crisis and dispatched
the foreign secretary to Katmandu , it
was already too late. The time for quiet, discreet, but effective diplomacy had
long since passed; the Constitution was already a “done deal” before we even
showed our cards.When the constitution-makers in Kathmandu
went ahead and issued the Constitution they had already agreed upon, India
reacted with a pique unbecoming of a major regional power. We showed our
displeasure publicly by, in effect, cutting off essential supplies on which all
Nepalese are dependent.
Making Enemies of Brothers
The problem was not just that
this came across as overbearing, but that it had all the subtlety of a blunderbuss:
instead of sending a message to the elite in the hills, we hurt people we
didn’t want to hurt – the aam aadmi of Nepal .
An ordinary worker in Katmandu who
can’t get an auto-rickshaw to take his pregnant wife to hospital because
there’s no petrol in the pumps isn’t going to worry about the niceties of
constitutional inclusiveness. He is just going to curse India
for doing this to him. We made enemies of the very people we have always
claimed are our brothers.
And what have we achieved by
doing this? A basic rule of international politics is that you apply pressure
calibrated to a desired outcome – in this case, changes acceptable to the
people of the Terai. But instead we imposed a blockade after the Constitution
had already been adopted; it would be impossible for any government in Katmandu
to change it at this stage under Indian pressure without being perceived as
surrendering its sovereignty. So we have incurred deep unpopularity in the
hills without gaining anything concrete for the Madhesis – a lose-lose
proposition.
Backing the Wrong Horse
On top of that New
Delhi allowed itself to be identified with the losing
side in the prime ministerial race, unsubtly backing Koirala and turning the
once-Indophile K P Oli into a raging anti-Indian chauvinist. Well, Oli’s now
the PM, Delhi : deal with it.
Relations with three of our
neighbours – Pakistan ,
the Maldives
and now Nepal –
are worse than they have ever been. If we don’t soon embark on a serious course
correction, the only question will be who we are going to alienate next.
(Former UN under-secretary-general,
Shashi Tharoor is a Congress MP and author)