[The
attacks pounded Syrian rebels who were trained and armed by the CIA
over the past two years but who appeared to get no warning that they were in
Russian jets’ crosshairs. The strikes also damaged a fragile U.S. strategy that
sustained an additional blow Friday when the Pentagon acknowledged that it was
sharply scaling back its
effort to build a force to battle the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL .]
Syrian army personnel load
howitzers near the
(Alexander Kots/Komsomolskaya
Pravda via AP)
|
Among
the first clues that Russia was mobilizing for a military offensive in Syria were requests Moscow began making in mid-August for permission to cross other
countries’ territory with more and larger aircraft.
“We were getting the word the Russians were asking for
inordinate overflights,” a senior Obama administration official said, referring
to reports from U.S. allies receiving the requests. Russia was seeking clearance for not only cargo planes but also
“fighter aircraft and bombers” that Syrian pilots had never been trained to
fly, the official said. “It was clear that something pretty big was up.”
But despite that early suspicion — which only intensified
as Russia then deployed fighter jets and teams of military advisers — the
United States seemed to be caught flat-footed by the barrage of airstrikes that
Moscow launched last week.
The attacks pounded Syrian rebels who were trained and
armed by the CIA over the past two years but who appeared to get no
warning that they were in Russian jets’ crosshairs. The strikes also damaged a
fragile U.S. strategy that sustained an additional blow Friday when the
Pentagon acknowledged that it was sharply scaling back its
effort to build a force to battle the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL .
The
setbacks involved separate programs with distinct missions. One is a covert
intelligence effort to aid Syrian rebels trying to oust President Bashar
al-Assad; the other is an overt military operation using U.S. air power and aid to other rebel groups on the ground to
decimate the Islamic State. But U.S. officials and experts said that in both cases the Obama
administration was slow to recognize and respond to trouble signs that seem
abundant in hindsight.
“It seems to me there’s some kind of gap or disconnect
between the intelligence side and the policy and operational side” on Syria , said Jeffrey White, a former Defense Intelligence
Agency analyst who tracks the Syria conflict at the Washington Institute. Amid Russia ’s buildup “we actually saw quite well what was going on
— equipment was tracked,” White said, “and then there was some kind of failure
to read what the implications of that were.”
The Russian airstrikes followed a series of moves by Russia that signaled a coming offensive, including the extension
of a key runway for bombers and military cargo planes. Similarly, the
Pentagon’s rebel training program was beset by problems that seemed potentially
fatal from the outset, including enormous difficulties drawing recruits to a
force set up to fight the Islamic State when most militants’ priority was the
ouster of Assad.
White House officials defended their handling of the
Russian escalation, saying they moved quickly to warn Moscow against making the
conflict worse, beginning with a call from Secretary of State John F. Kerry to
his Russian counterpart the first week in September.
Hesitation to take stronger action against the Russian
move, others said, stemmed in part from the administration’s belief, based on
an interpretation of signs earlier in the year, that Russian President Vladimir
Putin was moving toward withdrawing support from Assad and supporting
negotiations that would lead to his departure.
By early September, as Putin was deploying equipment and
personnel into Syria , his message was mixed. He was ready to attack
“terrorists” in Syria, the Russian leader said in several speeches at the time,
while also making clear that he believed the Syrian army was the only ground
force capable of defeating them.
With few options to prevent
the Russian deployments and concern about risking a wider proxy war, some in
the administration proposed taking “more of a wait-and-see attitude” to
determine whether Russia would actually attack the Islamic State, said a U.S.
official involved in the Syria discussions. “But when the first Russian strikes
were 40 miles away from ISIS territory,” the official said, “there was a completely
different view.”
The struggle to find a way to respond to the Russian
strikes has become a source of tension within the administration, according to
U.S. officials who said that CIA Director John Brennan has voiced frustration with U.S.
inaction as fighters
trained and armed by the agency at secret camps in Jordan over the past two years face a Russian
assault.
The CIA declined to comment on any aspect of its role in Syria .
Reports indicate that CIA -trained groups have sustained a small number of
casualties and have been urged to avoid moves that would expose them to Russian
aircraft. One U.S. official who is familiar with the CIA
program — and who like other officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to
discuss intelligence matters — said the attacks have galvanized some of the
agency-equipped units.
“Now they get to fight the Russians,” the official said.
“This improves morale.”
Numerous videos posted online in recent days appear to
depict fighters armed with antitank weapons celebrating after destroying
Russian-made tanks.
Even so, U.S. intelligence officials said Russia ’s intervention is likely to extend Assad’s hold on power
and prolong the conflict in Syria , putting additional strain on a U.S.-led coalition that
includes Saudi
Arabia , Qatar and the United Arab Emirates .
Brennan departed for the Middle East
last week as the Russian strikes intensified. U.S. officials said that the trip was previously planned and
not related to the bombings but acknowledged that his discussions centered on Syria . The trip came amid concerns that the coalition might be
fraying, worries that intensified after allies including the Saudi defense
minister and Jordan ’s King Abdullah II made summer visits to Moscow .
“The sense was that even as Russia was planning operations with Iran , [Putin] was trying to peel away U.S. coalition allies,” said a senior administration
official, “arguing that the U.S.-led plan wasn’t working.”
The Senate and House intelligence committees have begun
examining whether U.S.
spy agencies missed signals of Russia ’s intentions in Syria despite tracking the buildup over a six-week span.
“I don’t know that we foresaw that [Putin] was going to
come rushing in with troops and aircraft,” said Rep. Adam B. Schiff (D-Calif.),
a member of the House Intelligence Committee. “But I don’t know frankly that
Putin knew that he was going to do that until he made the decision. . . . I’m
not sure even Putin’s inner circle would have seen it coming.”
Although Russia’s intervention has been interpreted as a move to prop up Assad,
several U.S. officials said Putin’s priority is protecting Moscow’s interests
and influence in the region — including a long-standing military base in Syria
— rather than ensuring that Assad stays in power.
One U.S. official said Russia could still turn against Assad, picking a replacement
from within the regime and bolstering Putin’s ability when the conflict ends to
“negotiate a settlement favorable to Russia .”
The decision to dismantle the Pentagon’s training program
— whose small teams of fighters were often quickly captured or surrendered
their weapons to rival rebel groups in Syria — may force Obama to weigh ramping up support to the CIA -backed
groups.
“We could give them better technical systems that are
more accurate or can fly a little farther, and intelligence to support that
kind of targeting,” said White, of the Washington Institute. “But frankly I
think it goes against the grain of what Obama wants or is willing to do in Syria .”
Ellen Nakashima contributed to this report.