[Those
in detention include former Justice Minister Mullah Nooruddin Toorabi and
Mullah Jahangirwal, former secretary of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and
Allahdat Tayab, an ex-deputy minister, Afghan High Peace Council officials say.
]
By REUTERS
ISLAMABAD
(Reuters) - Pakistan has agreed to free some Afghan Taliban prisoners who could
be useful in reconciliation efforts, officials from both countries said on
Wednesday, the clearest sign that Islamabad will put its weight behind the
troubled Afghan peace process.
Afghan
officials, hopeful that direct contacts with top Taliban commanders could give
them leverage in any peace talks, have long urged Pakistan for access to
prisoners.
The
task of energizing the Afghan peace process is gaining urgency as NATO combat
troops prepare to withdraw by the end of 2014.
Some
Afghans fear the country could face civil war or another Taliban takeover if
insurgents are not lured into a serious peace process before then.
"Pakistan
has sent us a very strong message and Pakistan has agreed in principle to start
releasing prisoners from today," Abdul Hamid Mubarez, a member of
Afghanistan's High Peace Council, which is visiting Islamabad, told Reuters.
He
did not say how many prisoners would be released but predicted the action would
help advance the peace process.
Pakistan,
with its historical ties to Afghan militant groups, is seen as critical to U.S.
efforts to pacify Afghanistan, perhaps President Barack Obama's biggest foreign
policy challenge as he starts a second term.
It
is not clear why Pakistan made the gesture at this time but it has come under
mounting pressure to support U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan as the
endgame nears.
A
senior Pakistani army official said it had not yet been decided if the former
Afghan Taliban second in command, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, would be
released.
@
The New York Times
[The rise of so-called princelings like the Ye family will reach a capstone this week, when Xi Jinping, himself the son of a Communist Party pioneer, is to be unveiled as China’s top leader at the conclusion of the 18th Party Congress. Mr. Xi is likely to be joined by at least two other relatives of senior leaders on the seven-member Standing Committee. ]
By Ian Johnson
Philippe Lopez/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
|
BEIJING
— When Maoists were trying to keep control of China in the 1970s, a
powerful general from the south came to the aid of moderates, helping to arrest
the radicals and throw them in jail. The bold actions of the general, Ye
Jianying, paved the way for the country’s move to a more market-oriented
economy, and created a political dynasty that still plays kingmaker, able to
influence national policy and protect its sprawling business empire in southern
China long after his death.
Over
the past year, according to party insiders familiar with the situation, members
of Mr. Ye’s family have helped organize meetings to criticize the country’s current course and have
influenced top military appointments while helping block a vocal economic
reformer from joining the Politburo Standing Committee, the small, powerful
group at the top of the party hierarchy, because they felt that he was not
attentive to their interests.
The
rise of so-called princelings like the Ye family will
reach a capstone this week, when Xi Jinping, himself the son of a Communist
Party pioneer, is to be unveiled as China’s top leader at the conclusion of the
18th Party Congress. Mr. Xi is likely to be joined by at least two other relatives
of senior leaders on the seven-member Standing Committee.
Despite
rising controversy over their prominent role in government and business —
highlighted by recent corruption cases, as well as the fall of Bo Xilai, whose
wife was found guilty of murder — China’s princelings, who number in the
hundreds, are emerging as an aristocratic class with an increasingly important
say in ruling the country.
While
they feud and fight among themselves, many have already made their mark in the
established order, playing important roles in businesses, especially
state-owned enterprises. Others are heavily involved in finance or lobbying,
where personal connections are important.
“Many
countries have powerful families, but in China, they are becoming the dominant
force in politics and business,” said Lü Xiaobo, a political science professor
at Columbia University. “In this system, they have good bloodlines.”
Many
of the oldest among them — those now set to take power — share something else:
an upbringing during some of China’s most difficult years. Many were children
during the Great Leap Forward, when upward of 30 million people died of famine
from 1958 to 1962, and teenagers during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to
1976, a period many spent as outcasts or in exile after their parents were
attacked by Maoist radicals.
“This
is a volatile generation, one that didn’t have a systematic education and often
saw the worst side of the Communist revolution,” said a senior party journalist
who grew up with some of China’s princelings and spoke on the condition of
anonymity because of pressure from China’s security apparatus. “They’ve learned
one thing, and that’s all you can count on is your family.”
The
princelings are distinct from the current top rulers of China, most of whom owe
their allegiance to institutions in the Communist Party. The departing party
general secretary, Hu Jintao, rose up through the Communist
Youth League, one of the party’s central bodies. Likewise, the prime minister,
Wen Jiabao, who leaves office next year, is an organization man with few
outside sources of power.
Mr.
Hu’s legitimacy derives from being appointed by Deng Xiaoping, the last
leader to have played a central role in the Chinese Revolution and a dominant
figure until his death in 1997. Mr. Deng had a series of general secretaries
and prime ministers whom he dismissed before settling on Jiang Zemin after the
1989 Tiananmen uprising. Later, he gave Mr. Hu the nod as Mr. Jiang’s
successor.
“Without
a Deng to settle questions, you have competition for the top spots,” said an
independent Chinese political commentator who spoke on the condition of
anonymity because he is under police observation during the congress. “We don’t
have elections, and we don’t have a system, so they go for the person with the
most connections.”
That
was evident five years ago when Mr. Xi was picked to be Mr. Hu’s successor.
Initially, the front-runner had been one of Mr. Hu’s protégés, Li Keqiang. But
Mr. Xi won a higher-ranking slot, with the help of another
princeling, Zeng Qinghong, then vice president and son of a security minister.
Mr.
Xi’s career reflects his status. His father had been a senior party leader for
half a century: military commissar, governor, vice prime minister and pioneer
of market reforms, a background that helped create a network of support for Mr.
Xi.
The
elder Mr. Xi’s status helped his son enter university during the Cultural
Revolution when few were allowed to study, then secured him a job as personal
secretary to one of the country’s top military leaders. Later, when the younger
Mr. Xi was working in local government and ran afoul of a provincial leader, his family
got him transferred to a province run by a friend of his father’s.
Mr.
Li chiefly had his formal party affiliations and the backing of Mr. Hu, but no
deeply rooted network of family power. That proved decisive when he had to
compete with Mr. Xi for the top slot. (Mr. Li is set to replace Mr. Wen as prime
minister.)
Princelings
are far from a uniform bloc. Many grew up in Beijing’s “big yards,” the
sprawling housing compounds of the ministries and Communist Party organizations
that defined the capital in the 1950s, ’60s and ’70s. Children of senior leaders
studied and played together and, during the Cultural Revolution, fought each
other.
Many
of those tensions spill over today. Last year, the Ye family helped organize a
meeting of princelings whose parents participated in the 1976 arrest of the
Gang of Four, the group of Maoists who had dominated politics in the last years
of Mao Zedong’s life and threatened to keep control after the dictator’s death.
With Mr. Xi’s half sister taking notes, the Ye family and others met to
criticize China’s current direction.
But
the meeting was divided over how far to push political changes. Those close to
Hu Deping, the son of Hu Yaobang, the general secretary deposed by Mr. Deng in
the 1980s, have been clamoring for a relaxation of the party’s dominance over
government and business. Others, including those in the Ye family, reflect
their patriarch’s belief in party control.
Those
ties are extensive, especially in Guangdong Province, near Hong Kong, where
some members of the Ye family ran into conflict with the province’s party
secretary, Wang Yang, who has preached against corruption
and nepotism. The general’s various family members have served as provincial
governor, mayor of a special economic zone, head of an influential securities
firm, founder of a real estate firm and chief executive of an industrial and
media group. While Mr. Wang, the son of a laborer, has not investigated the Ye
family or challenged its status, party insiders say he did not concern himself
enough with its interests to satisfy the family. Starting last year, some
family members began whispering that Mr. Wang was not politically reliable, according
to party officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the
delicate nature of the information. Partly as a result of this campaign, Mr.
Wang is not expected to be on the Standing Committee when it is unveiled
Thursday.
China’s
ruling body, however, will be heavily stacked with relatives of senior leaders.
Yu
Zhengsheng, currently the Shanghai party secretary, has a glittering family
résumé that includes ancestors who served the Qing emperors, the Kuomintang
government and as senior leaders in the People’s Republic. Another expected
member, Wang Qishan, is married to the daughter of a powerful leader, Yao
Yilin.
Mr.
Xi’s widespread contacts in the military and
bureaucracy may allow him to act more vigorously than Mr. Hu. But some analysts
caution that his connections could make bold action difficult.
“There
are a certain number of princelings who are benefiting from the system,” said
Zhang Lifan, a historian in Beijing and the son of a minister of food under
Mao. “So there are a number of them who don’t want any change.”
Advocates
of broad political reform like Mr. Zhang look askance at the rise of the
princelings. In imperial days, nepotism was prevalent. When the Communist Party
took over, idealists hoped it would guard against that. “But for some reason,
we’re now back to nepotism,” he said. “And the country is ruled by a few
families.”
Edward
Wong contributed reporting. Mia Li contributed research.