[Tensions with China and Pakistan stretch a cash-starved military, while the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban removes a potential ally.]
By Mujib Mashal and Hari Kumar
In
the past year, it has tripled the number of troops in the contentious eastern
Ladakh region to more than 50,000. It has raced to stock up on food and gear
for freezing temperatures and 15,000-foot altitudes before the region is
largely cut off for much of the winter. It has announced that an entire strike
corps, an offensive force of tens of thousands more soldiers, would be
reoriented to the increasingly contentious frontier with China from the long,
volatile border with Pakistan.
India’s
military is now grappling with a reality that the country has feared for nearly
two decades: It is stuck in a two-front conflict with hostile neighbors — and
all three are nuclear armed.
And
it comes as India increasingly finds itself isolated in its broader
neighborhood, part of the global security backdrop to President Biden’s
discussions on Friday with India, Australia and Japan, the group known as the
Quad.
China
has made investments and inroads from Sri Lanka to Nepal. The victory in
Afghanistan by the Taliban, a movement nurtured and harbored in Pakistan that
has increasing ties to China, has essentially shut out India from a country it
saw as a natural ally in the regional balance.
Even
if all-out war on its borders is unlikely, the sustained posture is sure to
bleed India financially. With the coronavirus
pandemic exacerbating an economic slowdown, a force that was already
stretched on resources and struggling to modernize finds itself in what current
and former officials describe as a constant and difficult juggling act.
The
breakdown of trust between the giant neighbors is such that a dozen rounds of
talks since the
deadly clashes last year have contained the tensions, but they have
not resulted in de-escalation. Both nations are likely to remain on war
footing, even if they never go to war.
China
may have the advantage.
While
India is adept at high-altitude combat, it is up against a Chinese military
that is far better funded and equipped. China, with an economy five times the
size of India’s, is also investing heavily in the region, countering Indian
influence.
China
and Pakistan already share deep ties. Any collaboration to stir trouble would
test the Indian military reserves.
Gen.
Ved Prakash Malik, a former chief of the Indian army, said the clashes
in the Galwan Valley last year, which left at least 20 Indian soldiers
and at least four
Chinese soldiers dead, had fundamentally changed India’s calculation.
“Galwan
carried another message: that China was not respecting the agreements it had
signed,” General Malik said. “The biggest casualty in Galwan, to my mind, was
not that we lost 20 men, but the trust was shattered.”
Prime
Minister Narendra Modi of India is trying to expedite stagnant reforms in the
military to optimize resources. His government rushed additional emergency
funds to the army last year, after the border
clashes.
But
India’s constraints from the slowing economy were clear by the message in Mr.
Modi’s new
defense budget: The military simply cannot expect a significant increase in
spending. While the budget earmarked more money for equipment purchases, the
overall amount allocated for defense continued to decline, as a share of gross
domestic product and total government expenditures.
Sustaining
such troop presence in the Himalayan region is a mammoth logistical task,
albeit one with which India’s military has experience.
The
increased costs are bound to further slow investments in modernizing a deeply
antiquated force. The borders simply cannot be protected by rushing troops
to fill every vulnerability.
India’s
military has long lacked resources. About 75 percent of defense expenditure
goes to routine costs such as pensions, salaries and sustainment of force. In
2020, India spent about $73 billion on the military, compared with China’s
$252 billion.
“The
fact is that additional budgetary support is unlikely to come in the next few
years,” said D.S. Hooda, a retired lieutenant general who led India’s northern
command, which partly covers the Chinese border. “You need better surveillance.
You need much better intelligence on the other side. We can’t keep getting
surprised every time.”
Since
a major war in 1962, India and China have largely contained disputes through
talks and treaties. Flare-ups happen, because unlike with Pakistan where the
boundary is clearly defined on maps, India and China have not been able to
agree on the specific demarcation of the 2,100-mile
frontier referred to as the Line of Actual Control. Indian officials
say their Chinese counterparts have been reluctant, preferring to keep the
border’s uncertainties as a “pressure tactic.”
The
clashes last year were a blow to Mr. Modi, who has focused on developing a
formula of mutual prosperity with China.
A
cooperative relationship would not only help Mr. Modi’s goal of economic
development at home, but it would also avoid resources being swallowed by the
threat of conflict.
Since
Mr. Modi took office, the leaders of the two countries have met nearly 20
times, not allowing even a 73-day
standoff in 2017 to derail his efforts.
During
Xi Jinping’s three visits to India, Mr. Modi shared a swing with him and served
him fresh coconut. On one of Mr. Modi’s five trips to China, Mr. Xi welcomed
him with a Chinese ensemble playing a
Bollywood soundtrack from the 1970s as the prime minister clapped and
grinned. “You, you are the one the heart has called its own,” the song’s
original lyrics say.
The
Indian military establishment has remained more cautious than Mr. Modi, its
warnings against a resurgent China going back to the mid-2000s. The military
was particularly vulnerable in eastern Ladakh, where China has terrain
advantage — the Tibetan plateau makes moving troops easier — and better
infrastructure on its side of the border.
Over
a decade starting in 2006, the Indian government took steps to improve its
position. It approved thousands of miles of roads to be built closer to the
border, raised new divisions of army troops and even ordered the creation of a
mountain strike corps dedicated to the frontier with China.
But
in each case, ambitious plans on paper were met with the reality of scarce
resources. Some of the road projects remain incomplete. Despite cutting corners
and draining reserves, the building of the mountain strike corps was stopped
halfway — not because the threat had changed, but because the money was not
there.
Despite
constraints, the Chinese threat could fast-track some of the continuing
modernization. Mr. Modi has already intensified work on integrating the
abilities of its army, navy and air force through a process known as
theaterization that can help reduce overlaps and cost. The increased threat in
eastern Ladakh has refocused work on some of the unfinished roads and tunnels.
“It’s
not something that happened all of a sudden,” said Maj. Gen. Birender Singh
Dhanoa, who was formerly with the Indian army’s War College and involved in
studies on the transformation of the Indian forces. “The Chinese action
essentially forced a faster completion of some of the activities that had been
happening.”
One
factor in India’s favor is that its troops have experience in the type of
high-altitude fighting that would play out along the border.
For
decades, the Indian military has been carrying out huge logistical operations
in the mountains. It transports hundreds of tons of matériel every day to not
only sustain 75,000 troops guarding against Pakistan and China, but also to stock
up for six months of winter when many of the roads close. At the Siachen
Glacier — referred to as the battleground
on the roof of the world — Indian forces have maintained a face-off
with Pakistan for more than three decades.
During
last year’s clashes, India benefited from an element of luck, since the
tensions escalated during warmer weather.
“Had
this happened sometime in September, we would have to fly in troops. That was
the only option, because the passes have ice over it — 40 foot of ice,” said
A.P. Singh, a retired major general who led logistics operations in Ladakh.
But
India will have a hard time sustaining its increased presence on two fronts.
A
sudden rush of tens of thousands of additional troops meant shifting personnel
and resources not only from the reserves, but also from the units at the
Pakistani front.
Deployment
in the highest of altitudes tremendously increases transportation costs. It
also requires about 48 items of specialized gear, 18 of which — such as snow
clothing, snow boots, alpine sleeping bags, ice axes — are critical, General
Singh said. The cost of building outposts is five times higher in eastern
Ladakh than in the plains.
“When
the boys moved in, it was not that ‘I am going for patrolling for 15 days, and
I am back, and I will carry my arctic tent on my back.’ Everyone realized that
if something happens, you are going in for good,” General Singh said. “It’s
cost the country economically.”
Keith
Bradsher contributed reporting from Beijing.
India
and China
For
China and India, a Border Dispute That Never Ended
India-China
Border Dispute: A Conflict Explained
Mujib
Mashal is The New York Times correspondent for South Asia. Born in Kabul,
he wrote for magazines such as The Atlantic, Harper’s, Time and others before
joining The Times. @MujMash
Hari
Kumar is a reporter in the New Delhi bureau. He joined The Times in 1997. @HariNYT
