[Responding to a question, Colonel Wu
pointedly cited the specific article of a law detailing relations between Hong
Kong and the People’s Liberation Army. It allows the military to intervene,
when requested by Hong Kong’s leaders, to maintain order or assist in cases of
natural disasters.]
By
Steven Lee Myers
 |
|
People’s
Liberation Army soldiers at Stonecutters Island naval base in Hong Kong
last
month. China warned that it could mobilize Chinese troops to maintain
order
in Hong Kong. Credit Tyrone Siu/Reuters
|
BEIJING
— Warning that protests
convulsing Hong Kong were crossing a line, China hinted broadly on Wednesday
that it was prepared to use military force in the territory if necessary to
retain Beijing’s control.
“The behavior of some radical protesters
challenges the central government’s authority, touching on the bottom line principle
of ‘one country, two systems,’” said the chief spokesman for the Ministry of
National Defense, Senior Col. Wu Qian. “That absolutely cannot be tolerated.”
It was both the most explicit warning to date
since protests began in the former British colony and a stark reminder of who
has ultimate control over Hong Kong’s fate.
Colonel Wu made the comments at a briefing in
Beijing on a government document outlining China’s defense strategy. Citing
protests on Sunday outside the central government’s liaison office in Hong
Kong, which protesters splattered with paint and defaced with graffiti, he made
clear that the vandalism was straining Beijing’s patience.
China’s state television, which had largely
ignored the protests, highlighted the damage at the liaison office, calling it
“a humiliation of our country’s dignity.”
Responding to a question, Colonel Wu
pointedly cited the specific article of a law detailing relations between Hong
Kong and the People’s Liberation Army. It allows the military to intervene,
when requested by Hong Kong’s leaders, to maintain order or assist in cases of
natural disasters.
The People’s Liberation Army has for years
maintained a garrison of 6,000 soldiers in several bases around Hong Kong. But
China has never before ordered them to intervene in the territory’s affairs,
though several hundred did help clear trees and other debris after Typhoon
Mangkhut battered the city in 2018.
The new defense strategy unveiled in the
document did not mention Hong Kong, but it identified efforts to divide Chinese
territory as the country’s most pressing security threat.
The document also refused to rule out the use
of force against Taiwan, which China claims as its territory, in the event the
self-governing island took any formal steps toward independence.
It criticized “external forces” that support
such independence moves, an oblique but clear reference to the United States,
which has long provided support to Taiwan, including a new sale of more than
100 M1A2T Abrams tanks and other weaponry, worth $2.2 billion.
The warnings about what are, to China, core
matters of sovereignty underlined growing concern about threats to the central
authority of the Communist Party government under President Xi Jinping, whose
pledges never to cede any territory are central to his image as the country’s
most powerful leader in decades.
The new document on defense strategy — 69
pages in all — offered a detailed window into China’s rising military ambitions
under the leadership of Mr. Xi. It accused the United States of undermining
global stability and reflected China’s uneasy view of an increasingly uncertain
world. It also acknowledged shortcomings still hampering the People’s Liberation
Army, especially in the areas of artificial intelligence and what it called
“informationized warfare.”
“Greater efforts have to be invested in
military modernization to meet national security demands,” the strategy said,
noting that Chinese military spending was lower as a percentage of gross
domestic product than not only the United States and Russia, but also France
and Britain. “The P.L.A. still lags far behind the world’s leading militaries.”
Adam Ni, a researcher at Macquarie University
in Sydney, said the strategy was noteworthy for emphasizing the military’s
loyalty to the Communist Party and the primary mission of providing domestic
security. The centrality of the party’s role has been a recurring theme of Mr.
Xi’s statements ahead of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s
Republic of China in October.
The defense strategy “makes it clear that
maintaining internal security and social stability is the top priority for
China’s armed forces,” Mr. Ni wrote in an email. “It is a clear admission that
China’s military is oriented internally as much as externally.”
The strategy, with a title that included Mr.
Xi’s signature allusions to a “new era,” stopped short of explicitly
identifying the United States as an adversary, as the Trump administration did
with China (and Russia) in its own national security strategy in 2017.
It did accuse the United States of acting
unilaterally across the globe by expanding American capabilities in nuclear
weaponry, missile defenses, cyberwarfare and outer space. (President Trump last
year ordered the creation of the United States Space Force as a sixth branch of
the American military.)
“The international security system and order
are under attack,” Colonel Wu said. He went on to criticize those who have
described growing tensions in the world as a clash of civilizations akin to the
Cold War.
China’s defense strategy — and the comments
of the senior officials — made clear that China had its own red lines,
particularly dealing with anything perceived to threaten territorial
sovereignty.
It singled out, for example, the deployment
in South Korea of the American missile defense system called Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD.
Chinese officials have similarly accused the
Americans of supporting the protests convulsing Hong Kong and, more broadly,
for supporting Taiwan and its independence-minded president, Tsai Ing-wen, who
visited the United States this month.
Although China has long warned Taiwan against
steps toward independence, the language in the new strategy was more detailed
and voluminous than in previous versions. The document sharply criticized Ms.
Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party for “stepping up efforts to sever the
connection with the mainland.”
“While it does not look like a change in
policy, there is definitely more emphasis on Taiwan,” said Drew Thompson, the
director of China policy at the Pentagon from 2011 to 2018 and now a research
fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University
of Singapore. “That underscores the fact that Taiwan remains the main focus of
P.L.A. modernization efforts.”
Regarding Hong Kong, the law Colonel Wu cited
took effect when China resumed control of Hong Kong in 1997 and detailed the
activities of the military garrison that was established there soon after. The
forces are headquartered in a former British military building in Admiralty,
the area where many of the protests have unfolded.
In 2017, on the 20th anniversary of Hong
Kong’s return to Chinese rule, Mr. Xi presided over a military parade that was
the largest display of Chinese military force, with 3,000 soldiers in formation
hailing their commander in chief. For the most part, however, the troops have
largely kept a low profile.
Although the law says the People’s Liberation
Army will not interfere in “local affairs,” it allows the authorities in Hong
Kong to call on the military in extreme circumstances.
Beijing has urged the Hong Kong government
and the police to swiftly bring to justice those who stormed the territory’s
legislative offices on July 1 and the liaison office on Sunday, but officials
have also expressed confidence in the local authorities’ abilities to handle
the situation.
The use of force — even a symbolic display of
military might on the streets outside government landmarks — would be an
ominous and unpredictable turn in an already volatile situation.
Analysts said that the warning of military
involvement in Hong Kong could inflame, rather than calm, the underlying
grievances driving the protests.
“I think it is likely to backfire and further
harden public opinion and concerns about the Communist Party of China at a time
the ‘one country, two systems’ model is being called into question,” Elsa B.
Kania, an expert on Chinese military and defense strategy with the Center for a
New America Security in Washington, said in an interview.
The protests have already reverberated in
Taiwan, which holds a presidential election in January that is, by some
measure, boiling down to a referendum on ties with China.
In Taiwan, the Mainland Affairs Council
responded to the new strategy with a statement condemning the warnings. “The
Chinese Communist Party’s provocative behavior not only impacts cross-strait
peace,” the statement said, “it also seriously violates the peaceful principles
of international law and international relations.”
Ms. Kania said China’s hard-line message on
Taiwan could also be directed at the United States. Detailing China’s view of
the threat in a formal strategy was “intended to demonstrate resolve and a
sense of the stakes to the United States.”
Steven Lee Myers is a veteran diplomatic and
national security correspondent, now based in Beijing. He is the author of “The
New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin,” published by Alfred A. Knopf
in 2015.
Chris Horton contributed reporting from
Taipei, Taiwan, and Gerry Mullany and Austin Ramzy from Hong Kong. Claire Fu and
Yinuo Shi in Beijing contributed research.
