[At an annual televised news conference last week, South Korean President Moon Jae-in declined to say if he had specifically asked Kim to define the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” during their three meetings last year.]
By
Simon Denyer
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|
A
U.S. think tank said on Monday it had identified at least 13 of an estimated 20
undeclared missile
operating bases inside North Korea, underscoring the
challenge for American negotiators
hoping to persuade Pyongyang
to give up its nuclear weapons
and long-range missiles. (Reuters)
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SEOUL
— It is one of the central questions in the
negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program: What does Kim Jong Un want in
return for giving up his weapons?
Specifically, the issue is what Kim means by
his insistence on the “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” — and
whether that includes a demand for U.S. troops to leave South Korea and pull
nuclear-armed American bombers and submarines out of the surrounding region.
South Korea’s government is playing a key
role in mediating between the United States and North Korea. But it is
increasingly apparent that Seoul isn’t entirely sure about interpreting the
North’s demands, displaying a lack of clarity that clouds preparations for a
second summit between President Trump and Kim.
At an annual televised news conference last
week, South Korean President Moon Jae-in declined to say if he had specifically
asked Kim to define the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” during their
three meetings last year.
In response to that question, Moon began by
talking about American “hostility and distrust” toward North Korea. Then he
raised a separate issue: whether making a “political” declaration that the 1950-53
Korean War was over would affect the status of U.S. forces in South Korea.
In the end, though, Moon did say that Kim had
told all the heads of state he met in 2018 “that complete denuclearization is
not at all different from denuclearization demanded by international society.”
And he added that Kim “understands well” that
any decision on the status of U.S. forces in South Korea is entirely up to
Seoul and Washington to decide.
But compare Moon’s response with that of his
own unification minister, Cho Myoung-gyon.
Cho told a parliamentary hearing on Jan. 9
that Seoul does not share Pyongyang’s definition of denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula.
“Our ultimate goal is denuclearization of
North Korea, not the type of denuclearization described by Pyongyang,” he said,
explaining the divergence as “part of an ongoing process to draw North Korea to
the negotiating table and solve the problem.”
The ambiguity over such a central question
could be a negotiating tactic, leaving some tough questions for later in the
peace process when mutual trust is higher.
But many experts see it as a problem, a sign
that Trump and Moon are dodging some of the big issues in their desire to
declare the talks a success.
The United States is demanding the “complete,
verifiable and irreversible” denuclearization” of North Korea. But when Kim met
Trump in Singapore last June, he promised only to “work toward the complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
South Korea doesn’t have nuclear weapons, and
the United States withdrew its tactical nuclear weapons from the country in
1991.
So it’s back again to that pivotal question:
What exactly does North Korea want?
Its state media habitually portrays American
soldiers as “cunning wolves,” decries the “atrocities” it says they committed
during the Korean War and demands the invaders withdraw.
But in 2016, a government spokesman set out
Pyongyang’s definition of denuclearization of the peninsula, explaining “this
includes the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in South Korea and its vicinity,”
a definition North Korean state media restated in December.
“The withdrawal of the U.S. troops holding
the right to use nukes from South Korea should be declared,” it added.
But does that mean all 29,000 American troops
in South Korea, or only those that “hold the right to use nuclear weapons?” And
does Pyongyang expect Washington to remove the nuclear-armed bombers and
submarines stationed in the region?
In a New Year’s Day speech, Kim demanded
South Korea stop joint military exercises with the United States, adding that
“the introduction of war equipment including strategic assets from outside
should completely be suspended.”
Many South Koreans would feel distinctly
uncomfortable without the “nuclear umbrella” offered by the U.S. military. For
the Americans, withdrawing nuclear-armed forces from the broader region is not
negotiable.
Sung-Yoon Lee, a North Korea expert at Tufts
University, said Moon’s “meandering non-answer” to the question of how Kim
defines denuclearization was “telling.”
He believes Kim’s goal is to keep its nuclear
weapons while negotiating for the removal of U.S. forces, and Moon’s liberal
administration is playing into his hands by allowing him to “fudge” the
question.
Shin Beom-chul of the Asan Institute for
Policy Studies says the danger is that North Korea will demand U.S. forces
withdraw at the final stage of negotiations, as a condition for finally
dismantling its nuclear weapons.
But by then, sanctions may have largely been
lifted, leaving few levers to persuade Pyongyang to denuclearize.
“We have to check the concept of
denuclearization, and draw up a more profound road map for the denuclearization
process before lifting sanctions.” he said. “Otherwise North Korea is going to
take advantage at the last minute for its own interests.”
But some leading U.S. experts take issue with
the idea that the North Koreans really want the Americans out.
Robert Carlin and Joel Wit at the Stimson
Center in Washington were involved in negotiations with the North Koreans in
the 1990s.
They point out that Kim Jong Un’s father, Kim
Jong Il, told South Korean President Kim Dae-jung in 2000 that there was
“nothing bad” about U.S. troops staying on in the peninsula after all sides
sign a peace treaty, but only if their role was transformed to become “a
peacekeeping army” rather than “a hostile force.”
That stance was confirmed during various
rounds of negotiations from 1992 to 2001, Carlin said.
Pyongyang, at the time, saw the presence of
U.S. troops as geopolitical hedge “that would serve the regime as protection
against baleful Chinese and Russian influence,” he wrote in an email.
“Scattered bits of evidence suggest that is
also Kim Jong Un’s approach,” Carlin added.
But Chun Yung-woo, a South Korean
conservative who represented his country in talks over North Korea’s nuclear
program from 2006 to 2007, disagrees.
He said Kim Jong Il was probably doing his
best to sound reasonable when he met the South Korean leader, by not pressing a
demand that would be unacceptable to the other side.
Chun said that doesn’t mean Kim Jong Un isn’t
serious about denuclearization, if it is really the only way to develop his
country and lift international sanctions — especially since he hopes to remain
in power for decades to come.
“I would give him the benefit of the doubt,”
he said.
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