[Only a sharp starboard turn by the Decatur avoided a disaster in the calm equatorial waters that early morning in September — one that could have badly damaged both vessels, killed members of both crews and thrust two nuclear powers into an international crisis, according to a senior American official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to describe the encounter in detail.]
By Jane Perlez and Steven Lee Myers
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Chinese
naval vessels taking part in a drill near the Paracel Islands in the South
China Sea. China
has been rapidly expanding and modernizing its navy.
Credit
Agence France Presse — Getty Images
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HONOLULU — From a distance, the Chinese
warship warned the American destroyer that it was on a “dangerous course” in
the South China Sea. Then it raced up alongside, getting perilously close. For
a few tense minutes, a collision seemed imminent.
The American vessel, the Decatur, blasted its
whistle. The Chinese took no notice. Instead, the crew prepared to throw
overboard large, shock-absorbing fenders to protect their ship. They were
“trying to push us out of the way,” one of the American sailors said.
Only a sharp starboard turn by the Decatur
avoided a disaster in the calm equatorial waters that early morning in
September — one that could have badly damaged both vessels, killed members of
both crews and thrust two nuclear powers into an international crisis,
according to a senior American official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to
describe the encounter in detail.
The ships came within 45 yards of each other,
marking the closest call yet as the United States Navy contests China’s
military buildup in the South China Sea. The Sept. 30 encounter signaled what
American commanders fear is a perilous new phase in confrontations in the
disputed waterway, which are unfolding without even a Cold War-style agreement
on basic rules of conduct aimed at preventing escalation.
“A game of chicken is being played around
Asia’s flash points,” said Brendan Taylor, an expert on the South China Sea at
the Australian National University.
“It is only a matter of time before a clash
occurs,” Mr. Taylor said, adding that he sees significant potential for such an
event to escalate into a larger crisis.
China’s defense minister, Wei Fenghe, and
Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis are expected to make an effort to calm those
rising tensions and reduce the risks of miscalculation when they meet in
Washington on Friday.
But the trade war and Vice President Mike
Pence’s speech last month declaring that the United States would take a far
tougher line on China give the two men little incentive to ease tensions in the
waterway.
Despite the risks, neither side appears ready
to back down.
The United States and China “will meet each
other more and more on the high seas,” the chief of naval operations, Adm. John
M. Richardson, warned after September’s near miss.
The Trump administration told the Navy last
year to execute more operations against China’s territorial claims, and it has
sent warships more frequently to waters near the artificial islands China has
bulked up with aircraft hangars, runways, deepwater harbors and, most recently,
short-range missiles. Washington also recently asked allies to contribute their
ships to the task.
“In response to this situation I believe that
China will have to take the necessary measures to increase the cost of such
provocative actions by the U.S. and other relevant countries,” said Wu Shicun,
president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies in Haikou, China,
who often reflects the view of the Chinese Navy. “Otherwise the actions of the
provocative parties will only be more frequent and unscrupulous.”
The near crash with the Decatur showed,
however, the dangers of the rivals squaring off against each other.
The incident occurred as the Decatur, with
300 crew members, sailed within 12 nautical miles of Gaven Reef, a pair of
outcroppings in the sea that China has enlarged and fortified with weaponry
since 2014. The Chinese destroyer, called the Lanzhou, with a similar number of
seamen, sped up from behind and overtook it.
This account of what happened is based on
interviews with American officials, as well as a video released by the British
Ministry of Defense to The South China Morning Post that was described as
authentic by an American defense official.
As China deploys more planes and ships to
challenge American dominance in the region, such encounters may become more
frequent. The United States says there were 18 unsafe incidents in the air and
at sea between Chinese and American ships and aircraft in the Pacific region
last year, a slight increase from previous years.
The lack of an agreement between China and
the United States on the rules of the game in the South China Sea raises the
risk of a deadly mishap, analysts say.
In 2001, a collision between a Chinese
fighter jet and an American EP-3 spy plane over the waters off Hainan Island
killed a Chinese pilot and soured relations for months. The two governments
later agreed to set up a hotline between their militaries for handling such
incidents, but that channel was not entirely effective.
During the Cold War, Washington and Moscow
abided by an Incidents at Sea Agreement that more or less governed the way the
navies of the two countries operated. But the naval contest between the United
States and China is different.
Then, Moscow and Washington wanted to ensure
freedom of navigation of the high seas to allow both powers to pursue their
global interests. The rivalry between Beijing and Washington, however, centers
on China’s territorial claim over virtually the entire South China Sea and
America’s efforts to challenge it. The two sides have staked such adamant
positions that any compromise to defuse or avoid confrontations seems unlikely.
The mission of the Decatur was to make the
point that the high seas are open to all, and that the 12-mile zones claimed by
China as sovereign territory do not stand up to international law. The Chinese
argue that international law, as defined by a 2016 ruling by the Permanent
Court of Arbitration in The Hague, does not apply.
In 2014, the United States and China, along
with other countries, signed the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, which
mimics aspects of the earlier pact with the Soviets and spells out protocols
for confrontations.
But the code is voluntary, and it does not
address the basic question of territorial waters and who can go where, said
Collin Koh, a maritime specialist at the Rajaratnam School of International
Studies in Singapore. “It’s more like a gentleman’s agreement,” he said.
Last week, Admiral Richardson urged China to
“return to a consistent adherence to the agreed code,” which he said would
“minimize the chance for a miscalculation that would possibly lead to a local
incident and potential escalation.”
In effect, he was asking Chinese vessels to
stop acting as lords of the South China Sea.
The growing sense of confrontation is
enhanced by American concerns that its ships and crews are on the defensive
after 70 years of unquestioned power across the Pacific Ocean.
In May, the head of the United States
Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Philip S. Davidson, told Congress that China
controlled the South China Sea “in all scenarios short of war.”
That has led to a re-evaluation of the Navy’s
strategic and spending priorities. As the Trump administration pushes the Navy
to do more in the South China Sea, it is doing so with fewer assets just as the
Chinese are increasing theirs.
In 2017, China had 317 warships and
submarines compared to 283 in the American Navy. Even with 60 percent of the
Navy in the Pacific, a smaller total force means fewer deployments around
China’s periphery.
A projection by the Pentagon shows that by
2025, China’s military will have 30 percent more fighter aircraft and four aircraft
carriers compared to its current two, a senior American military official said.
The Chinese are also expected to have significantly more guided-missile
destroyers, advanced undersea warfare systems and hypersonic missiles, the
projection says.
The American concerns about Beijing’s naval
modernization are reflected in a fictional account titled “How We Lost the
Great Pacific War,” written by the director of intelligence and information
operations of the Pacific Fleet, Dale F. Rielage, and published in an official
Navy journal.
The article portrays a possibly dark outcome
for the American Navy in the Pacific.
Written in the form of a military dispatch
from the year 2025, the author laments how the Navy had to “cannibalize
aircraft, parts and people” and wonders if it will be able to “claw” its way
back in the Western Pacific.
At the heart of this bleak prognosis is an
assumption that the United States did not act aggressively enough in
challenging China when it still could.
The article describes how an admiral, at the
start of his term as chief of naval operations, saw that the Americans’ margin
of victory in high-end naval combat had become razor thin — and would continue
shrinking. “At the time, he assessed that the margin, though thin, remained ‘decisive.’
In the years following, however, the margin shifted imperceptibly to favor the
other side.”
The article never names “the other side,” but
makes clear: it is China.
Jane Perlez reported from Honolulu and Steven
Lee Myers from Beijing. Follow them on Twitter at @janeperlez and
@stevenleemyers
