[Similarly,
prolonged trouble in Nepal China India Afghanistan Nepal Nepal India China
By P. Stobdan*
Flashpoints in the Himalayan region are
rising. The US Defence Department has expressed caution about China's increased
troops build-up along the Indian border as well as the likelihood of China
establishing “additional naval logistic hubs” in Pakistan[1].From the Chinese
perspective, the spectre of jihadi terrorism is spreading across Xinjiang
province. The monks in Tibet continue to resist China's military suppression.
Pakistan, for its part, continues to sponsor terrorism in Kashmir with
China's tacit support. In Nepal, the
vortex of the political crisis refuses to stop.
This trend of events unfolding on both sides
of the Himalayas is forming an interconnected chain. The issues involved
transcend rugged mountains and even well-drawn cartographic and military lines.
Signs of instability on one side impacting the another are visible. One would
have hardly imagined that China’s dissenters, Uighurs and Tibetans could meet
on this side of the Himalayas[2].
Conventional wisdom had the Indian Himalayan
belt being at least peaceful. Conviction also explained that freedom of
religion (Buddhism) has ensured stability on this side of the mountain range.
This sadly is no longer the case. The entire belt from Tawang to Ladakh has
been subject to a string of incendiary events threatening to pitchfork the
region into crisis.
At the root of most of the troubles on the
Indian side is the Tibetan standoff. For years, the subtlety of Lamaism – the
main powerhouse of Tibetan politics – has taken an intricate sectarian context.
Tension that has been festering around it for decades is now getting murkier
and complex by the day, and this is clearly happening not without Chinese
prompting.
Beijing may have found it easy to play on the
sectarian fault-lines as the surest way of breaking Tibetan unity. From clergy
to laity, the refugee community is driven by sectarian fissures that seem
difficult to heal[3]. Even the Dalai Lama seems to be finding it hard to keep
his Lama flock together. The sectarian divide is ricocheting throughout the
Indian Himalayan region, engulfing even Indian Buddhists from Tawang to Leh and
pushing them deeper into the throes of anxiety. Trouble could erupt at any time,
and perhaps in a big way.
Clearly, sectarian rife in the Himalayan
region points to strategic calculations involved. It may well have been a part
of China’s well-thought-out game plan of passing the Tibetan puzzle across to
the Indian side. China has viewed the Himalayas as a bridge and Tibetan
Buddhism as a useful vehicle of influence. This policy had underpinnings in
Chinese strategic thinking under the Ching Dynasty (1644-1911) that patronised
Tibetan Buddhism as a means of imperial expansion.
Following the departure of Dalai Lama from
Tibet in 1959, China not only eagerly let all major Tibetan sectarian heads
flee but perhaps coordinated the exodus of their reincarnated ones as well.
Over the years, these powerful masters have ably set up parallel religious
institutions across the border – their network is spread across India. A clear
trend in the source of funding for building such mega religious infrastructure
along the Southern Himalayas is known to all. Clearly, Beijing controlled the
trends of Lamaism not just in Tibet but in the rest of the Himalayan region as
well.
India, by contrast, saw the Himalayas as a
barrier. For most Indian mandarins, China’s game was not fathomable. Instead,
frequently emerging signposts of trouble were put under the wraps. Gullible
Indian policy-makers, in fact, worked on various schemes for facilitating every
move that the Chinese made. They rejoiced in harbouring numerous spiritual
heads as key assets without realising that the policies they pursued perfectly
suited Beijing. According to a former foreign secretary, Chairman Mao Zedong
had once conveyed a message to Prime Minister Nehru through a visiting Indian
Communist delegation to Beijing that “he should keep the Dalai Lama in
India”[4]. And now 57 years down the road, India has gained little. Instead, it
now finds itself worryingly and helplessly entangled in the Tibetan quagmire,
with serious implications for the stability of its own frontier region.
Firstly, take the case of excessive
Tibetanization of the Himalayan states, which has become a serious, even
incendiary, social and political issue over the past few decades, although it
has been repeatedly downplayed by the government. The process began with rising
prosperity among Tibetan refugee communities, thanks to the generous support
provided to them by the Indian government and foreign donors. The entire
process also apparently involved corruption, scams, and misuse of government
institutions on a fecund scale. This, at the same time, has cut into the interests
of indigenous, mostly tribal, communities which have been complaining about
administrative apathy and relative socio-economic deprivation. This is what has
sparked-off a string of pent-up inter-ethnic tensions simmering across the
region[5].
Secondly, concerns have grown over the swift
taking over of Indian monasteries by Lamas from outside. In fact, a mapping of
India’s key institutions that have fallen into the hands of non-Indians masters
looks frightening[6]. Ironically, the Tibetan issue is becoming less about
‘freeing Tibet from China’ and more about creating Tibet in India. A major case
in point is the struggle over the Rumtek monastery in Sikkim[7]. The takeover
of monasteries in Ladakh has been rather hassle-free despite Article 370. The
entire process seems to be wrapped in a psychosomatic order; blackmailing of
innocents into submission through religious means. By now, the entire region
has seemingly acquiesced to this fact.
The third, and most dangerous, trend of all
is growing sectarian rifts that are threatening to tear apart Himalayan
stability. Suitors of all sorts with deep funding from Chinese-sponsored
Buddhist networks are having a field day. They are building their respective
sectarian networks while skillfully managing to manipulate Indian laws, buying
off influential individuals and local institutions.
In Ladakh, people have been helplessly
watching the sectarian game ignited by outsiders. The menace is creating havoc
among a people hitherto devoid of any sectarian differences. It is consuming
every walk of life, threatening to divide and cripple the society. The
situation took a critical turn last summer when the Dalai Lama ordered the
Buddhists of Ladakh not to entertain a rival Karmapa, Thaye Trinley Dorje
(TTD), during his visit to the region in 2015. The Dalai Lama has not approved
TTD and instead recognised Ugyen Trinley Dorje (UTD) as the 17th Karmapa, who
also enjoys China’s official recognition. While a majority of outfits in Ladakh
followed Dharamshala’s instruction, other sectarian groups barring the Geluk
chose to defy the gag and went ahead to welcome TTD. Clearly, other sects
including Druk-pa Kagyu, Drikung Kagyu, Ning-ma and even the Sakya sect do not
question the spiritual authenticity of TTD altogether. The incident, however,
led to a split in the All-Ladakh Gompa (Monastery) Association (LGA), which is
equivalent to a Sangha. The LGA office has since been locked to avoid any
direct conflict between sects[8].
To be sure, sectarian rife and the growing
sinister power struggle among various sects will become worse especially in the
post-Dalai Lama scenario, for the issue also pertains to retaining the current
supremacy of Geluk-pa sect in the Tibetan order. Interestingly, a media report
recently highlighted a communication between the Dalai Lama’s aide (from the
Geluk Monastic Council) and Chinese authorities about a joint ‘project’
ostensibly to decide next the Dalai Lama[9].
It is widely believed that the Dalai Lama
would prefer to install his chosen Karmapa, Ugyen Trinley Dorje, as the next
leader, at least in the interim. But there are other young Lamas such as
Drukchen Rinpoche, head of Druk-pa Kagyu, who would wish to fill the post-Dalai
vacuum. The latter claims Ladakh to be his bastion. He often challenges Dharamshala’s
diktats.
Amidst all this turmoil, it is not
unreasonable to wonder whether such discord among Tibetans would be happening
without it being scripted by China. If so, China is clearly winning both the
Tibetan and the Himalayan games. But the most galling aspect in all this is the
absence of an alternative to stall the process.
Some observers have suspected China’s hand in
the recent May 2, unrest in Tawang in which two monks were killed over a
dispute about building dams for hydroelectric projects. But the issue appeared
to be more about the abbot of Tawang Monastery, Guru Tulku Rinpoche, whose
nationality was questioned by the local Monpa monks.
Sikkim has been on the boil for decades over
contesting sectarian parties claiming rights to Rumtek’s ownership. In Nepal,
China is funding the K. P. Oli government with Buddhist projects and has sent a
Tibetan monk, Drukhang Thubten Khedrup Rinpoche, Vice Chairman of the Buddhist
Association of China, to oversee the Buddha Jayanti celebration this year in Lumbini
on 21 May[10].
The central government’s inability to gauge
this trend has been rather surprising. Does it show a lack of understanding or
does it want to encourage the trend? It seems clueless in the face of its
apparatus working hand in glove with the operators. Worse, regional leadership
is also not clear about whether they are not in compliance or part of the
caucus.
India is helplessly losing the game. The
situation is deteriorating rapidly and getting perilous enough to begin to
wonder whether Indian Buddhists in Mon-Tawang or in Ladakh can even retain
their hold. A delay in resolving the crisis, whose ends are not in sight, will
make the Himalayan belt more vulnerable. The government, therefore, needs to
wake up and pull itself out of its current confusion. Peace in the Himalayan
region must be preserved at all cost, before it slides irretrievably into the
hole.
Developments require constant monitoring and
comprehension. The government must curtail outsiders from freely impinging in
sensitive areas. It should instead boost the indigenous Buddhist strength and
resources; introduce new regulations to protect local religious institutions
and practices; and provide the necessary stimulus for people to regain their
confidence.
Ladakh, Sikkim and Tawang had their own rich
historical profile. They need to be careful not to fall into a downward spiral
and lose their identity. Ladakh needs to restore the authorities of Kushok
Stag-sang Raspa, Kushok Bakula, Kushok Thiksy, Kushok Togdan and Kushok Stag-na
and others who were pillars of the Buddhist tradition across generations. Their
role in stabilising the border areas have been unparalleled. In their actions,
they always kept in mind the core interests of Ladakh and the nation.
Rekindling their spirit is more than an imperative today.
Similarly, prolonged trouble in Nepal is
neither in China’s nor in India’s interest. The current problem is part of a
miscalculation that also gave birth to the ongoing predicament in Afghanistan.
The experiment with new political models has failed to meet the hopes and
aspirations of the Nepali population. Make no mistake of underestimating the strategic
importance of Nepal to Asian stability. Any durable stability can only be found
by reviving the old and time-tested system of Monarchy, which alone will serve
the interest of Nepal, India, China and the world.
Tibet is certainly a keystone to Himalayan
stability. China will find it difficult to tackle the Tibetan problem once the
Dalai Lama is gone. Therefore, it is time for Beijing to settle the issue. But
it appears that world powers are going to get locked into a major contestation
over the next Dalai Lama. As Beijing is preparing to select the 15th Dalai
Lama, the US, India and others too seem to be gearing up to play the counter
game. As for the Dalai Lama himself, the whole idea of searching for the next
soul seems to be an absurd idea and he probably wants to put an end to the
politics of reincarnation which is not feasible in 21st century politics,
though he has spelled out several ideas for his successor[11]. Tibetans would,
however, need a Dalai Lama. To be sure, Beijing too understands the need for
finding the next Dalai Lama either of its own choice or otherwise.
Long-term stability on both sides of the
Himalayas cannot be achieved without working together or seeking coordinated
policies. It is time to bring together the interests of both the Indian and
Chinese governments toward seeking the common goal of saving the Himalayas and
the people living in the region.
* The author is a former Ambassador, an expert on Asian
affairs, and currently a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies
& Analyses, New Delhi. The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
(IDSA) is a non-partisan, autonomous body dedicated to objective research and
policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence and security. Its mission is
to promote national and international security through the generation and
dissemination of knowledge on defence and security-related issues. Views
expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
IDSA or of the Government of India.
[1] US
Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and SecurityDevelopments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016
[2] The
11th Inter-ethnic/interfaith Leadership Conference organized by Initiatives of
China/Citizen Power of China May 1, 2016 .
[3]
Younten Phuntsok, “We are losing our ground: TibetanStruggle,” June 16, 2014 .
[4] Personal conversation with author.
[5]
Mila Rangzen, “Is Dharamshala Safe for Tibetans?,”
Tibet June 12, 2014
[6]
“Dozen monasteries of Drukpa Buddhist lineage taken over by monks with strong financial backing,” Economic Times, 3 December 2014 , also see, “Eye on border, China September 25, 2014
[7]
“Struggle for Rumtek worries home ministry,” Times of India ,
May 31, 2002
[8] Yatish Yadav, “Close aide of Dalai Lama Denies Chinese Whispers in Monastery Land,” May 1, 2016
[9]
Yatish Yadav, “Hush! Tibet Government in Exile Plays Footsie with China,”
May 1, 2016
[10]
Bharat Bhushan, “Buddha in a diplomatic jam: Nepal-China take on India
over Buddhist
heritage,” May 11, 2016 ;
Craig Lewis, “Indian Officials to Boycott Buddhist Conference in Nepal
in Diplomatic Spat,” May 16, 2016
[11]
“The Last Dalai Lama?,” The New York Times, December 1, 2015
