[The pitch of Nepalese criticism
at any given time has depended on the degree of hostility or political
insecurity felt by a particular power centre in Kathmandu
vis-a-vis India .
With the exception of King Tribhuvan (who escaped from Rana’s custody, was given
refuge by Nehru, and who actually suggested Nepal ’s
merger with India ),
the monarchy in Nepal
was actively engaged for several decades in undermining the treaty in letter, or
spirit or both. Birendra’s Zone of Peace proposal was one such thinly disguised
attempt. (An emissary from New Delhi
was sent to Kathmandu to give a blow-by-blow picture of
the implications for Nepal
if the treaty was abrogated, and Birendra was said to be so shaken that the
project was eventually abandoned).]
By K.V. Rajan*
The Treaty of Peace and
Friendship between India
and Nepal is
nearly six decades old; its relevance for India ’s
security in today’s context is limited and questionable.
The Maoist demand for “scrapping”
the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal has been
greeted with a sense of alarm, as if it is something new or sinister. In fact, it
is neither. The treaty, which was a straightforward imitation of understandings
dating back to British India days, and basically offered
economic opportunities in India
for Nepalese nationals against Nepalese assurances that India ’s
security concerns would be respected, became an irritant in India-Nepal
relations as soon as it was signed on 31
July, 1950 . In Nepal’s eyes, India’s growing sense of insecurity, generated
by an apparently aggressive and expansionist China, had compelled it to yield
to expediency, abandon its support for the incipient democratic movement
against the autocratic Rana regime, and seek to constrain Nepal’s sovereignty
so that it was compatible with India’s security perceptions. The treaty, signed
between the Indian Ambassador with Prime Minister Mohun Shumshere Rana (a
disrespect for protocol which added insult to Kathmandu’s sense of injury) in
the last days of his discredited regime, was accompanied by an exchange of
letters which was not made public until many years later — in 1959, when they
were placed on the table of the Indian Parliament.
The pitch of Nepalese criticism
at any given time has depended on the degree of hostility or political
insecurity felt by a particular power centre in Kathmandu
vis-À-vis India .
With the exception of King Tribhuvan (who escaped from Rana’s custody, was given
refuge by Nehru, and who actually suggested Nepal ’s
merger with India ),
the monarchy in Nepal
was actively engaged for several decades in undermining the treaty in letter, or
spirit or both. Birendra’s Zone of Peace proposal was one such thinly disguised
attempt. (An emissary from New Delhi
was sent to Kathmandu to give a blow-by-blow picture of
the implications for Nepal
if the treaty was abrogated, and Birendra was said to be so shaken that the
project was eventually abandoned).
But even when Nepal
had a democratic dispensation, there was a certain unity across the political
spectrum that, while the economic benefits accorded by the treaty were
essential for Nepal ,
the treaty in its existing shape was not compatible with national self-respect.
The Nepali Congress was the only party which usually hesitated to raise the
matter of treaty revision, because of the close personal affinities between its
leaders with Indian counterparts and their desire not to rock the boat of
bilateral relations. But in private conversation they, too, voiced similar
reservations.
In 1994, the CPN
(UML) minority government assumed power after an election campaign dominated by
issues such as abrogation of the 1950 treaty, ending the special relationship
with India, renegotiating agreements on cooperation in water resources, and
ending the recruitment of Nepalese gurkhas in the Indian Army — exactly the
issues raised by the Maoists today. Yet, the UML was quick to moderate its
positions as soon as it assumed office. Prime Minister Man Mohan Adhikari made
it clear that he was not for abrogation of the treaty: “friendship treaties can
be amended, they should never be abrogated.” An institutional arrangement at
the Foreign Secretary level was set up in March 1995; but after a few rounds of
discussion, it became clear that India
was not interested in “amendment”: the treaty had either to be abrogated or
maintained in its present form, as the text of the treaty did not provide for
modifications. In private conversation, the Nepalese argued that this was not a
very valid approach; the treaty had already been amended in 1950, even before
the ink on the signatures was dry, by the exchange of letters accompanying it. It
had effectively been amended again in 1965, through another exchange of letters
which basically “committed” India
to supply all of the Nepal Army’s armament needs. So why couldn’t it be amended
again? But given India ’s
“either we keep it or you abrogate it” approach, Nepalese leaders did not go
beyond making proforma noises about review of the treaty being under active
discussion.
Gujral “doctrine”
The Gujral “doctrine,” which in
effect promised all of India ’s
neighbours (especially Nepal )
a bilateral relationship based on non-reciprocity, revived fresh hope in Nepal
that the treaty could be “updated.” As Foreign Minister and later as Prime
Minister, I.K. Gujral demonstrated a certain willingness to accommodate
Nepalese expectations, as demonstrated by negotiations on the Mahakali Treaty
and the transit route through India ’s
sensitive “Chicken’s Neck.” Foreign Minister Kamal Thapa visited India
in August, 1998, with a “non-paper” which, for the first time, set out Nepalese
ideas for a revision of the treaty. He made the mistake of publicising in
advance the objective of his visit; the Nepalese media mentioned separate
treaties on mutual security and economic cooperation accommodating both
countries’ legitimate needs and concerns. But Thapa was sent back empty-handed
— India ’s
traditional resistance to changing the treaty re-asserted itself.
Issue to the forefront
It has taken the remarkable
electoral success of the Maoists to bring the issue again to the forefront. Should
India continue
to evade the issue, despite the widespread sentiment in Nepal
favouring a revision? The treaty is nearly six decades old; its relevance for India ’s
security in today’s context is limited and questionable. China
is no longer the only security concern in the sub-region, and in any case it is
doubtful if it needs to ally itself with Nepal
in order to create problems for India .
The Himalayas have been replaced by the open border as India ’s
main defence perimeter. Pakistani activities in and through Nepal, migration, smuggling
of narcotics and arms, terrorism, human trafficking, traditional cross-border
trade and investment, regulation of the open border, development of border
infrastructure and, above all, human insecurity have emerged as the urgent
priorities. Management of water resources, environment and climate change, also
have serious long-term implications for the security of both countries.
The treaty is already respected
more in the breach than observance. Indian nationals in Nepal
had long ago lost any entitlement under the “national treatment” clause; they
can still travel to Nepal
without a visa, and the Indian rupee is legal in Nepal ,
but permission to work, purchase property, and engage in activities on a par
with the Nepalese is usually not available. Nepalese migrants to India ,
too, do not have the same rights they used to enjoy in many areas. Gurkha
recruitment to the Indian Army continues but there is already a demand to phase
this out and increase the intake of Indian Gurkhas.
* The author was India ’s
Ambassador to Nepal
from 1995 to 2000.
