By Rahul
Bhonsle
 |
| Image courtesy: NDTV |
In
a quick response to the election results in Bhutan,
Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh flashed a congratulatory message on Sunday
14 July to the leaders of the winning Party, the People’s Democratic Party
(PDP). Dr Man Mohan Singh’s message
stated, “It gives me great pleasure to felicitate Your Excellency on the
success of the people’s Democratic Party, as well as your own election to the
National Assembly in the historic second democratic election in Bhutan”. The
PDP beat rival Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT) winning 35 seats in the 47 assembly
elections in the second round of polls which were held based on candidates
fielded by both the parties. There were 381,790 registered voters and around
80,000 postal voters. This was a surprising turnaround as in the first round
for selection of two parties to field candidates, the DPT got a majority of
votes at 45 percent a clear 10 percent lead over the PDP.
India has been quick in
hailing the victory as success of the electoral democracy in the country given
the comprehensive success of the former main opposition party country. Many
believe that relations between India and Bhutan in the past few years had
deteriorated that had led to a number of measures from New Delhi that had put
the DPT led previous government under pressure. The withdrawal of subsidy just
close to the elections was one such measure that had sent a clear signal to the
electorate of the likely economic challenges that the common man would face in
case relations with India were strained.
Thus Dr Singh also
reassured the PDP leaders of continuing support by India. He said, “I would
like to avail of this opportunity to assure you of the steadfast and
unflinching support of India and its citizens for the steady steps that Bhutan
is taking to further strengthen democratic processes and institutions. India is
a privileged partner of Bhutan and it’s people in their socio-economic progress
and development. Our bilateral ties are anchored in a strong foundation of
trust, mutual confidence and understanding. I wish to reiterate India’s
undiminished commitment to Bhutan in preserving these unique and special
traditional ties. India is, and will remain, sensitive to Bhutan and its
interests”.
The PDP had at one
stage made the DPTs poor record with India and reach out to China an election
issue though this was put on the back burner later after objections by Bhutan’s
Election Commission. The two parties agreed not to discuss foreign policy
during the campaigning.
Dr Manmohan Singh was
quick to emphasise the need for nurturing ties between the governments and
stated, “Our endeavor would be to strengthen these ties further. We look
forward to working with you and your colleague to further enhance our
cooperation for the benefit of the people of both our countries. I have
therefore already instructed officials of my Government to prepare for the
discussions on our plan assistance to Bhutan.” The latter was an obvious
reference to the differences that have arisen over cut back in subsidies and
plan assistance to Bhutan
The victory of the PDP
in Bhutan has raised particular hopes of an early settlement of the withdrawal
of supply of LPG and kerosene by India. Many have attributed some of the recent
cutbacks by the Indian government to the unhappiness of the previous DPT led
administration under chief and former Prime Minister Jigme Thinley. Thinley was
seen to follow a relatively independent foreign policy opening diplomatic ties
with large number of countries and having a tete a tete with former Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao in Rio in 2012 ostensibly against Indian advice.
Indian withdrawal of
subsidy to Bhutan in fuel and particularly cooking gas raised a major challenge
for the people which resulted in a number of outbursts though controlled by the
public. It is quite apparent that this was part of the overall strategy by the
Government of India to subtly put pressure on Bhutan to vote out the DPT. This
has paid for the time being projecting the PDP, a pro India party to victory.
But polarization of politics in Bhutan may not be in larger Indian interest in
the long term and would reflect general trend across the region with political
divide in other neighbours with a pro and anti India tilt in parties be it in
Bangladesh or Nepal. Yet high politics is more about the immediate rather than
the remote future.
INDIA-BHUTAN-CHINA STRATEGIC TRIANGLE
[South Asia experts from Chinese think tanks, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) as quoted by the Hindu in a report on 26 June 2012 have been quick to speculate that Bhutan would not have taken these initiatives without India’s express, “approval or agreement.”]
By Rahul Bhonsle
 |
| Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (R) meets with Bhutan's Prime Minster Jigmi Y. Thinley in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 21, 2012. (Xinhua/Li Xueren) |
India Bhutan and China
are part of a strategic triangle in the Eastern Himalayas with the inverted
apex jutting in the form of the all important Chumbi Valley in Yadong (Yatung)
county of Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR).
Given proximity of the Chumbi Valley to India’s jugular to the North
East the 20 kms wide Siliguri corridor, the two arms of the triangle resting on
Indian state of Sikkim in the West and Bhutan in the East assume importance.
Chinese plans to extend the Qinghai Tibet railway to Xigaze and Yadong close to
the Sino Indian border have added to concerns in India with tardy communication
links on the Eastern frontier. Given the strategic significance, India has been
able to maintain balance primarily through the Indo Bhutan Treaty of Friendship
first signed in 1949 and revised on mutually agreed terms in 2007.
Thus two arms of the
triangle could be said under Indian control and influence, even as China holds
the base. This equation may be upset in case China is able to gain greater
access to the Bhutanese arm of the triangle with a reset of the Sino Bhutan
boundary, negotiations for which are underway. Given the difficult terrain on
the Western arm of the Chumbi Valley and scope for expansion is primarily in
the East. These fears were attenuated with the first ever summit held between
the prime ministers of Bhutan and China in Rio recently. An over view of the
relationships would therefore be in order and is covered as per succeeding
paragraphs.
Indo Bhutan Treaty of
Friendship in 2007 has led to greater diplomatic freedom to Thimpu opening
prospects of engagement across the board. The most significant change in 2007
was mutual reaffirmation of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the
preamble of the Treaty which was not there in
the 1949 text. More over Article 2 of the 1949 Treaty stated that Bhutan
will be guided by the advice of India on external relations. The Article read,
“The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal
administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Government of Bhutan agrees to be
guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external
relations”. This has been reviewed and Article 2 of the 2007 Treaty reads,
“__the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic
of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their
national interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for
activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other”. The sum
total of implications of the change is greater freedom of choice to Bhutan in
management of sovereignty and external relations.
This background is
essential to understand the nuances of the first ever bilateral meeting held
between the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and Bhutan’s Prime Minister,
Jigmi Y. Thinley on the side lines of the Rio Conference on Sustainable
Development in June 2012. While Bhutan
has been expanding foreign relations over the years and in 2011 chaired South
Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), there was no formal
diplomatic relations or summit level contact with Beijing. Having greater
autonomy post 2007 Treaty, it is inevitable that there would be greater
traction for Bhutan to establish diplomatic relations with China the only nation
other than India with which it shares a land border. Proposal for diplomatic
relations was first discussed between the two countries in 1998 during the 12th
Round of border talks.
Significantly, Bhutan
and India are the only two countries with which China has not resolved land
borders. There are two areas of dispute, one falling in North West Bhutan
covering 269 sq km and the other Central
Bhutan covering 495 sq km. The North
West area comprises Doklam (89 sq km), Sinchulumpa (42 Sq km), and Shakhatoe
(138 Sq km) in Samste, Haa and Paro districts and Central parts the Pasamlung
and the Jakarlung valley in the Wangdue Phodrang district. The 1998 agreement between Bhutan and China
entitled, “Maintain Peace and Tranquility on the Bhutan-China Border Areas,”
provides the framework for stability on the border. However despite this there have been reports
of intrusions by Chinese troops in Bhutanese territory. In November 2007 some reports indicate
dismantling of unmanned posts in the Dolam Valley. Bhutan’s media reported a
number of intrusions in 2009.
At the same time Bhutan
and China have held 19 rounds of talks on the boundary dispute so far the last
one being held in January 2010 after a gap of four years where a joint field
survey was agreed upon. This was to be carried out of disputed areas in Doklam,
Charithang, Sinchulumpa and Dramana in Bhutan’s North West and Pasamlung and
the Jakarlung valley in the Wangdue Phodrang district in Central Bhutan. It is
reasonably well established by now that China is looking for a package deal
with Bhutan seeking areas in the North West while establishing Bhutan’s claims
in the Central region. This offer was first made in the sixth round of talks
held in August 1990. Chinese quid pro quo
does not take into account that the territory is a part of the sovereign state
of Bhutan and strategic interests seem to be pushing Beijing to offer a package
to the southern neighbor. Herein lies
the rub where India’s interests come in given proximity of the North West areas
to the Chumbi Valley. In case Bhutan seeks to appease China to move the
trajectory of relations forward, it would most certainly cause concern in Delhi
and may even be objected to.
In the light of this
legacy the Wen Jiabao – Thinley meet seems to be an opening gambit by both
sides to test the waters on how far they can push the envelope without India
blocking the package deal altogether. Premier Wen Jiabao as per a report by the
AFP stated, "China is willing to establish formal relations with Bhutan,
resolve the border issue between the two nations at an early date, strengthen
exchanges in all areas and advance Sino-Bhutanese relations to a new
stage." A report in the Hindu of 27 June also quoted Mr. Wen saying that
China was “willing to complete border demarcation with Bhutan at an early
date.” Mr. Thinley was quoted by Xinhua the official Chinese news agency to
have expressed that Bhutan wishes to forge formal diplomatic ties with China as
soon as possible.[1] Bhutan has also sought China’s support in elections to the
non permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council being vacated by
India in 2013.
South Asia experts from
Chinese think tanks, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
(CICIR) and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) as quoted by the Hindu in
a report on 26 June 2012 have been quick to speculate that Bhutan would not
have taken these initiatives without India’s express, “approval or agreement.”
The official web site
of the Cabinet Secretariat of the Royal Government of Bhutan however makes
muted remarks on the bilateral summit and states, “The meeting [Wen
Jiabao-Thinley] carries great historic significance as it marks the first
meeting between the heads of the two governments. They discussed bilateral
issues of mutual interest and multilateral cooperation including Bhutan’s bid
for a non permanent seat on UN Security Council for the term 2013-2014,
elections for which are to be held in fall this year”. No mention was made of
either diplomatic relations or boundary issue.[2]
Bhutanese writer,
Kuenzang Choden writing in web site The Bhutanese on 22 June 2012, quotes Media
Attache of Bhutan Prime Minister’s office to refute any initiative by Prime
Minister Thinley to propose establishment of diplomatic relations with China.
He states, “local Chinese media had misreported that Bhutan and China will
establish diplomatic ties.” Kuenzang further goes on to quote a Foreign
Ministry official who sought to remain anonymous indicating, “It is unlikely that Bhutan and China will
have diplomatic relations soon. There are certain policies when it comes to the
Permanent five of the United Nations Security Council.” [3]
There are obviously
different versions being floated of deliberation during the summit. Has the
Chinese media gone overboard in flagging the initiative for bilateral relations
and resolution of boundary issue will not be clear but without a push from the
officials accompanying the Prime Minister these reports are unlikely to have
been published. Has Bhutan gone ahead with the move after approval from New
Delhi as some Indian media reports and Chinese scholars seem to suggest or the
Prime Minister of Bhutan has been misquoted by the Chinese media as Bhutanese
authorities are indicating or this is an unilateral initiative by Thimpu, hence
the foreign office cover up is not clear so far.
Suffice to say that
first summit level contact between Bhutan and China has been established and
the engagement will be taken forward to establish diplomatic relations and
possibly even resolve the boundary issue in times to come. The trajectory may
not be easy to determine at this juncture nor the time frame predictable.
Settlement of boundary however is unlikely to happen soon. Given importance of
the Chumbi Valley India is unlikely to agree to any concessions by Bhutan that
leads to exchange of territory in this area providing further elbow room to
China. Fears expressed by reports in the Indian
media may therefore may be unfounded.
On the other hand
Chinese keenness to extend the railway line to Yadung and secure the Bhutanese
arm of the Chumbi Valley triangle may be as much due to fears of India cutting
off the salient jutting threateningly towards the Siliguri corridor. This will
overcome the vulnerability of the Siliguri Corridor providing it additional
depth. This could be one explanation for given the operational challenges of
launching a major thrust through the Chumbi Valley to cut off the Siliguri
corridor and India’s build up of forces on the Eastern front, Chinese offensive
in the area will be posed major operational challenges.
Whatever it be, given
mutual apprehensions, strategic stability in the India Bhutan China triangle
would require statesmanship of a high order. This will depend on how the
political and military leadership of the three countries and especially New
Delhi and Beijing are able to manage the same ensuring Thimpu’s sovereignty and
autonomy. The Indian government has done
well not to over react to media reports and would be seeking full details of
Chinese interaction from Bhutan to chart out a future course of action. This
will no doubt be done keeping in view larger national interests of managing
relations with China amicably yet not compromising on basic national security
interests, thus implying any attempt to extend the Eastern arm of the inverted
apex of the Chumbi Valley will be fiercely resisted by New Delhi.
@ Eurasia Review
@ Eurasia Review
