[Qatar, in alliance with Turkey, has given strong
financial and diplomatic support to the Muslim Brotherhood, but also to other
Islamists operating on the battlefields of Syria and, before that, Libya. Saudi
Arabia and the Emirates, by comparison, have sought to restore the old,
authoritarian order, fearful that Islamist movements and calls for democracy
would destabilize their own nations.]
 |
Egyptian Presidency European Pressphoto Agency
The interim Egyptian president, Adli Mansour,
center, met with officials of
the United Arab Emirates in Cairo on Tuesday
|
WASHINGTON — Two
of the Persian Gulf’s richest monarchies pledged $8 billion in cash and loans
to Egypt on Tuesday, a decision that was aimed not only at shoring up a shaky
transitional government, but also at undermining their Islamist rivals and
strengthening their allies across a newly turbulent Middle East.
The robust financial aid package
announced by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates came a day after the
Egyptian military killed dozens of Muslim Brotherhood members protesting last
week’s military ouster of Egypt’s Islamist president, Mohamed Morsi. The aid
package underscored a continuing regional contest for influence between Saudi
Arabia and Qatar, one that has accelerated since the Arab uprising upended the
status quo and brought Islamists to power.
Qatar, in alliance with Turkey,
has given strong financial and diplomatic support to the Muslim Brotherhood,
but also to other Islamists operating on the battlefields of Syria and, before
that, Libya. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, by comparison, have sought to
restore the old, authoritarian order, fearful that Islamist movements and calls
for democracy would destabilize their own nations.
The promise to provide so much
assistance also highlighted the limits of American leverage: the United States provides
Egypt $1.5 billion in annual aid, a small fraction of what the gulf states have
promised. But the gulf intervention contrasted sharply with the Obama
administration’s uncertainty about how to respond to the military takeover, and
more broadly, how to wield influence across an increasingly chaotic and
fragmented Arab world where American interests are hard to define.
The White House has said it is
reviewing the circumstances of the takeover before making a decision on the
annual aid to Egypt — which some in Congress, notably Senator John McCain of
Arizona, have said should be suspended, calling the takeover a coup d'état. But
on Tuesday, the White House spokesman, Jay Carney, struck a somewhat different
tone, saying the administration was encouraged by the timetable provided by
Egypt’s interim authorities for a transition to elections and a fully civilian
government.
The Saudis and Emiratis were
nearly buoyant at the military’s move to oust Mr. Morsi. Both are deeply
hostile to the Brotherhood’s Islamist-cum-democratic agenda, which they see as
a threat both to their own monarchical legitimacy and to regional stability.
Qatar, by contrast, provided about $8 billion in aid to Mr. Morsi’s government
during his yearlong tenure, and Turkey offered loans of $2 billion.
The tensions between Qatar and
Saudi Arabia are older and broader than the Arab uprisings that began in 2011.
Saudi Arabia, which prefers to work its checkbook diplomacy quietly and behind
the scenes, sees itself as the regional leader. But the Qataris have for years
fashioned an outsize foreign policy, often rebuffing Saudi Arabia’s perceived
interests, using its wealth and Al Jazeera, the television network it built, to
play a decisive role in some of the region’s most volatile and important events.
Qatar, host to the largest
American military base in the Middle East, has also eagerly financed Islamists
in Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Egypt, often siding with the Muslim Brotherhood or
its affiliates, like Hamas. Qatar angered the Saudis (and the Obama
administration) by supporting Islamist rebels in Syria and providing some
heavier weapons, like shoulder-fired missiles, against American advice.
Suddenly, some of the tables have
turned on Qatar.
With the rise of the Brotherhood,
the Saudis had largely cut off aid to Mr. Morsi’s government and ignored
American requests to help Egypt manage a worsening economic crisis. After Mr.
Morsi was ousted by the Egyptian military, the Saudi and Emirati governments
were quick to issue strong statements of support for the transition. On Friday
night, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia personally called Egypt’s army chief, Gen.
Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, to reinforce his backing for the caretaker government,
The Associated Press reported.
“This is clearly a setback for
the ideology that Qatar and Turkey support and encourage,” said one Arab
official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity so as not to antagonize two
powerful nations. “If political Islam was a stock, it would have gone down
dramatically over the past week.”
Qatari officials declined to
comment on the rivalry. But one Qatari official, speaking on condition of
anonymity, said Qatar’s financial aid in the past had been to the Egyptian
people, not any individual figure or party.
The Qataris suffered two other,
lesser setbacks in recent days: on Monday, 22 journalists at Al Jazeera
resigned en masse, citing what they said was the station’s biased coverage of
the Brotherhood. Al Jazeera’s bias in favor of the Islamist group has often
been cited as a grievance against Qatar’s rulers, who are accused of using the
station as an arm of their activist foreign policy.
Also on Tuesday, Ghassan Hitto,
the prime minister of the main Syrian exile opposition group — who was seen as
favorable to Qatar — resigned. Although the reasons for his resignation were
not clear, it was generally viewed as a concession to Saudi Arabia, which had
signaled its discontent with him.
Some analysts say Qatar has
already begun to rein in its aggressive and eclectic foreign policy, which has
included a willingness to engage with Iran that infuriated its Saudi neighbors.
Last week, Qatar’s government joined Saudi Arabia and others in issuing a
message of support to the transitional government installed by the Egyptian
military, even as its allies in the Brotherhood protested furiously against
what they called a military coup.
“It’s starting to look as if the
Qataris have ceased playing the role of troublemaker and freelancer in the
region, and falling in behind the Saudis,” said Peter Harling, an adviser with
the International Crisis Group. “Events are allowing the Saudis to assume a
regional leadership role that no one else can play right now.”
Despite Qatar’s strong financial
support for Mr. Morsi’s government, some analysts say Qatari officials had privately
become very critical of his many blunders over the past year. “The Qataris were
not happy with the decision to take Morsi out, but they were not so happy with
Morsi, either,” said Mustafa Alani, an analyst with the Dubai-based Gulf
Research Center.
The shift in Qatar’s role may
also be related to the accession last month of the new Qatari emir, Sheik Tamim
bin Hamad al-Thani, Mr. Alani said. The emir led a joint Saudi-Qatari committee
formed in 2007 to reduce tensions between the two countries, and he is widely
thought to take a less aggressive approach to foreign policy than his father,
Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, the former emir.
Qatar’s support for the Muslim
Brotherhood was seen by some analysts as a policy based on pragmatism rather
than ideology — it was viewed as a populist group that could deliver results,
unlike its more secular and often more fractious rivals. That perception, too,
may change now that the Brotherhood has been deposed in Egypt. Turkey’s support
for Brotherhood affiliates was more a matter of shared principles: Turkey’s
governing party is a mildly Islamist and populist group. But Turkey’s own
struggles with a domestic protest movement in the past two months is likely to
curtail its appetite for foreign adventures.
The Qatari and Turkish financial
aid to Mr. Morsi’s government last year helped him to avert painful economic
reforms being urged by the International Monetary Fund as the price for its own
$4.8 billion aid package. The United States believes those changes — including
a reduction of food and electricity subsidies — are necessary to help bring
Egypt out of its crushing deficit and economic malaise.
But the Saudi and Emirati aid may
serve the same purpose, staving off unpopular decisions and limiting another
potential avenue of American influence over Egypt’s next government.
