[China
has twice asked Mr. Kim, who inherited the leadership of North Korea after the death of his father at the end of last
year, not to proceed with missile tests, and twice he has rebuffed the
entreaties. Shortly after he came to power, a Chinese vice minister of foreign
affairs, Fu Ying, visited Pyongyang to warn him not to conduct a test. In
April, Mr. Kim went ahead anyway with a rocket launching, which fizzled. Last month, Li Jianguo, a member
of the Politburo, visited North Korea to again urge restraint. ]
By Jane Perlez
BEIJING — Even though North Korea ignored China’s appeal not to test
its new longer-range missile, the new leadership here appears intent on
remaining a steadfast supporter of its wayward neighbor because it considers
the North a necessary buffer against the United States and its allies.
Analysts
said that China’s overriding fear was of a collapse of the hard-line Communist
government in Pyongyang, which could lead to the reunification of the Korean
Peninsula under a government in Seoul allied with the United States. China,
they said, would consider an American presence on its doorstep untenable.
But
China’s unyielding support of Kim Jong-un has a serious downside, they added,
because it may lead to a result nearly as unpalatable: efforts by the United
States and its regional allies Japan and South Korea to contain China.
“It
stirs up regional security,” said Zhu Feng, a professor of international
relations at Peking University who favors reducing support for North Korea.
Without naming the United States, he added that the missile launching
“facilitates China-bashers to work on hard-line policies to contain China, or
just balance China.”
Obama
administration officials were clearly exasperated this week with China’s
inability to rein in Mr. Kim, saying that they were considering a stronger
military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.
Beneath
the official tolerance of North Korea, a debate about the wisdom of remaining
loyal to such a world outlier and its defiant young leader simmers among analysts who
strive to influence China’s foreign policy.
China
runs the risk, Dr. Zhu said, of being bunched together with North Korea as one
of “the two bad guys.”
“I
feel very frustrated,” Dr. Zhu added. “At least we should distance ourselves
from North Korea. The reality is, as long as North Korea can’t change their
behavior, then peace and stability on the peninsula will be increasingly
vulnerable.”
China
has twice asked Mr. Kim, who inherited the leadership of North Korea after the death of his father at the end of last
year, not to proceed with missile tests, and twice he has rebuffed the
entreaties. Shortly after he came to power, a Chinese vice minister of foreign
affairs, Fu Ying, visited Pyongyang to warn him not to conduct a test. In
April, Mr. Kim went ahead anyway with a rocket launching, which fizzled. Last month, Li Jianguo, a member
of the Politburo, visited North Korea to again urge restraint.
Despite
their displeasure, China’s leaders see little choice but to put up with such
indignities.
The
slight pique expressed by the Foreign Ministry on Wednesday was not a signal
that China would alter its course, the analysts said, or back tougher sanctions
at the United Nations.
The
official reaction was “very hesitant,” said Jin Canrong, a professor of
international relations at Renmin University in Beijing.
After
the missile test, Washington immediately started pushing for deeper sanctions
at the United Nations and for a tightening of existing sanctions that China
agreed to after earlier rocket launchings.
“China
will not support a resolution; it will favor a president’s statement,” said Cai
Jian, the deputy director of the Center for Korean Studies at Fudan University
in Shanghai. A president’s statement at the United Nations is considered a much
weaker form of condemnation than sanctions.
A
major reason for not backing new sanctions is the fear that they would provoke
North Korea to test another nuclear weapon, a far worse prospect than the
launching of an unarmed rocket like the one on Wednesday, said Jonathan D.
Pollack, a North Korea expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
“The
North Koreans demurred from a third nuclear test in April, very likely under
major Chinese pressure,” Dr. Pollack said.
In 2006 and 2009, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon soon
after launching missiles. Dr. Pollack said a repeat of that action would pose a
major test to the Obama administration, as well as to the new Chinese leader,
Xi Jinping.
“Pyongyang
may have decided now is the time to put down a major marker as Obama’s second
term approaches and as South Korea elects a new president,” he said.
Beyond
the hard strategic questions for the new Chinese leadership, the concerns among
ordinary Chinese about why China bankrolls such a ruthless government should be
considered, several Chinese analysts said.
“Internally
in China, many voices are questioning all this spending on rocket launches
instead of on improving people’s livelihoods,” said Jia Qingguo, an expert at
Peking University.
The
South Korean government recently estimated that North Korea had spent $2.8
billion to $3.2 billion since 1998 on its missile program, said Stephan M.
Haggard, a professor of Korea-Pacific studies at the University of California,
San Diego. That amount of money would have bought enough corn to feed the
country for about three years, Dr. Haggard said.
The
debate within China about its relationship with North Korea stems from the
unusual nature of the alliance. Fundamentally, the two governments do not like
each other and harbor deep mutual suspicions, said Stephanie T.
Kleine-Ahlbrandt, the China and Northeast Asia project director of the
International Crisis Group in Beijing. When North Korean officials visited
Singapore this year to get new ideas for Mr. Kim’s government, leaders in
Beijing — who have sent teams of their own to Singapore to study its softer
form of one-party leadership — became very nervous, she said.
The
larger fear is that any fundamental change in North Korea could send waves of
refugees into China, who would be considerably more difficult to absorb than
people of other nationalities on China’s borders.
“For
the Chinese,” Ms. Kleine-Ahlbrandt said, “there are fewer problems keeping
North Korea the way it is than having a collapse.”
Bree
Feng contributed research.
