[Ethnic nationalism is on the
rise in Nepal .
With only
29,391,883 (July 2011 est.) inhabitants and measuring only 147,181 square kilometres,
Nepal is host
to 59 ‘nationalities’ (janajati). None of these nationalities, including the
predominant Khas population – consisting of Brahmin-Ksetri castes, speaking
Nepali (Khas) and practising Hinduism – can be considered a single majority
group. The Khas, however, remain determined to propagate their language,
culture, and religion through their control of state institutions. While ethnic
mobilization in Nepal has largely, to date, avoided bloodshed, the frustration
of minority nationalities, ethnicities, castes, and tribes (janajati) is an
important factor behind the growing popularity of the Maoists’ ‘people’s war’.]
By Bal Gopal Shrestha
In the wake of political reforms
instituted in 1990, non-Khas nationalities began asserting their own national identities
within the boundaries of the current state. A new constitution was introduced
that year, confirming Nepal
as a multinational (bahujati) and even multilingual (bahubhasika) country. The
constitution, however, retained the Nepali
(Khas) language as the official ‘national language’ and Hinduism as the sole
‘state religion’. Although the constitution provides liberty for ethnic non-Khas
and non-Hindu religious communities to express themselves – against the
domination of the ‘one nation, one language, and one religion’ policy of the
government – minority languages and religions remain without legal protection.
The major demands of the non-Khas
nationalities in Nepal
are: the right to autonomy; political representation in the central government;
equal rights for their languages in the courts, in education, and in local and
central administration; and an end to the domination of Hindu religion and
culture. The ‘All Nepal Nationalities’ Organisation’(Akhil Nepal Janajati
Samgha), a Maoist sister organization to the Communist Party of Nepal, has
presented the most radical demands, including the right of secession for all
nationalities in Nepal .
The influence of the Maoist Party, engaged in a violent ‘people’s war’ for more
than six years, is increasing throughout the country and threatening its
stability.
As the ruling class manipulating state
institutions, Brahmin-Kshetris are the target of other nationalities’
criticism. The latter find it insulting to be categorized alongside low-caste
Hindus. Mainstream scholars also define these groups as ‘tribes’. Most groups
in Nepal including the Newars, Tamangs, Magars, Gurung, Sherpa, Limbu, Rai, and
Tharu, do not accept the labels ‘ethnic groups’ or ‘minorities’. They prefer to
be called ‘nations’ and believe they fulfil all the criteria of nationhood:
language, religion, culture, territory and a history of independent statehood, which
would be achieved again if rights to secession were granted. All these groups
now accept the Nepali word Janajati, translated as ‘nationality’ in English. In
1990, when eighteen of these groups gathered to create a forum called Nepal
Janajati Mahasamgha, they translated it as the ‘Nepal Federation of Nationalities’.
The search for ‘national identities’ in Nepal
may be a recent phenomenon, but has deep roots in the past. Until 1769,
present-day Nepal
was composed of small independent states and principalities of different
‘nationalities’. The Gorkhali king Prithivi Naryanan Shah, forefather of the
present ruling dynasty in Nepal ,
embarked on an expansionist campaign,
bringing several small states and principalities under the control of Gorkha.
His successors continued the expansionary
policy, which came to an end only
after their defeat in a war with the
British East India Company (1814-1816). It was only in the 1930s that the Nepalese
government began to adopt the name ‘Nepal ’
in an attempt to make it a modern nation state (Burghart 1996: 255). In general, people of
different origins within the country’s borders continued to live together in
peace over the centuries. However, this ended when groups began to feel
discriminated against by the state.
Soon after the Gorkha conquest of 1769, the Gorkhali king Prithivinarayan Shah
proclaimed his country to be the ‘True
Land of Hindus’ (Asali Hindustan). In 1854, Jangabahadur, the first Rana prime minister, introduced written laws
based on Hinduism, dividing the country
hierarchically and subordinating all other nationalities to the Brahmin and Ksetris (Khas) ruling class. In
1960, King Mahendra, the father of the present king, introduced the party-less political system called ‘Panchayat’, which proclaimed Nepal the only ‘Hindu Kingdom’ and ‘Nepali or Khas
the only official language’, thus ignoring
its multi-religious, multinational, multicultural, and multilingual character.
The ruling Hindu population of Nepal
articulates its nationalism by imitating Indian Hindu nationalists, whose vivid
forms have been discussed by several
scholars (Van der Veer 1994; Jaffrelot 1996). Thirty years of Panchayat
politics (1960-90) channeled support to Hindu religious organisations such as
the ‘World Hindu Council’ (Visva Hindu Parisad) while ignoring the issues of
minorities and their rights. Encouraged
by Hindu fundamentalists in India ,
Nepalese Hindu extremists are gaining momentum. They have taken inspiration
from Indian organizations like the ‘Hindu god Siva’s Army’ (Siva Sena) to form
groups like the ‘Cows Welfare Association, Nepal ’.
It is notable that, even today, a person found guilty of killing a cow is condemned
to capital punishment by Nepalese law. Few were surprised when Hindu
fundamentalists announced substantial
cash rewards to anyone cutting off the head of Padma Ratna Tuladhar, then
Minister of Health and a champion for human rights, when he spoke on behalf of
the beef-eating communities of Nepal .
Undercurrents of insurgency With
the downfall of the former Communist regimes in Eastern Europe , many small nations have emerged, while others remain incipient. Tamil
insurgents in Sri Lanka
can be seen as one of the most
destructive examples of national uprisings in the South Asian region. In Southeast
Asia , Indonesia
is experiencing equally violent uprisings. For decades, India
has been witness to Assamese,
Naga, Jharkhand, and Gorkhaland national movements, whose grievances remain
unresolved. In many respects, present-day ethnic nationalist movements in Nepal
are heavily influenced by events elsewhere, though they are unusual in their,
by-and-large, non-violent record.
The Nepalese government has taken
few steps to fulfil ethnic demands. The news is now broadcast in several
languages, but the Supreme Court of Nepal infuriated non-Nepali speakers with
its 1999 decision prohibiting the use of local languages in municipalities and
District Development Committees.
At present, all ethnic groups in Nepal
feel they are overshadowed by Khas linguistic and cultural chauvinism. This situation
can only lead to undesirable hostilities. A number of bloody incidents have
recently taken place in eastern Nepal ,
in which local people killed Brahmins,
burnt down their houses, and chased
them away from their villages. Up until now, however, ethnic uprisings in Nepal
have been peaceful in nature and,
except in a few cases, violence has been avoided. The most interesting aspect
of the present ethnic mobilization is
that the nationalities are united
through the Nepal Federation of Nationalities
in their fight against the ruling Khas. The
failure of parliamentary parties in Nepal
to address the grievances of these
nationalities has caused the latter to turn towards the Maoists for support.
It has been noted that the
Maoists receive active support from
non-Hindu ethnic groups and oppressed low castes (dalit) (Bhattachan 2000:146-50). The majority of people killed by the police, on the suspicion of Maoist activity, come
from ethnic nationalities and oppressed castes. Yet Nepal ’s
ethnic nationalities are aware of the
reality across their northern border, where the
Tibetan minority population has been subjected to great distress under
the rule of Maoist China. Bhattachan
speculates that the Maoists’ war has played a crucial role in preventing ethnic
insurgency in Nepal .
To develop mutual understanding among
the different groups in a multiethnic country like Nepal
is a difficult task. Until recently, the king has served as the ‘unifying
symbol’ of all nationalities in Nepal ,
even as the political reforms of 1990 curtailed the king’s power by introducing
parliamentary democracy. Over the last decade, King Birendra regained considerable popularity,
largely as a result of the political instability caused by the corrupt
leadership of constitutional parties. The
‘palace massacre’ of 1 June 2001 ,
in which practically the entire royal family was murdered, has exacerbated
tensions and instability in the country. The only surviving brother of the
slain king, Gyanendra, has now become king.
Unfortunately, in contrast to the
great respect shown to his slain brother and his family, people do not trust
the present king. Images of deified kings of the past have been destroyed. The
Maoists, forming the most
powerful extra-constitutional political party, represent recent developments as
the ‘death of monarchy’ in Nepal
and urge the country to declare itself a republic. This is an unprecedented
situation for the entire nation. While nationalities remain suspicious of the
present developments, they are speculating about possibilities for favourable
change.
The most recent trend in Nepalese
ethnic mobilization is the active involvement of Maoists; their populist appeals
are attracting adherents. The majority of ethnic nationalities, including a
large section of Magars, Tamangs, and Newars in Kathmandu
Valley , are sympathetic towards the
Maoists.
Despite its cultural richness, Nepal
is one of the poorest and most underdeveloped countries of South
Asia . Its people are facing various problems, including ethnic
nationalism and a violent Maoist people’s war. A small country with many
nationalities, the government is unable to effectively address ethnic conflict.
If ethnic uprisings are not handled with
great care, Nepal
may face trouble in the near future, as
has been experienced by the Balkan
states, by Southeast
Asian countries, or by neighbouring India ,
Sri Lanka , and Pakistan .
As indicated above, ethnic insurgency in Nepal
has been prevented thus far because of the people’s war launched by the Maoists.
The involvement of ethnic nationalities in this bloody war, however, has become painfully apparent.
References
- Bhattachan, Krishna B, ‘Possible Ethnic Revolution or
Insurgency in a Predatory Unitary Hindu
State , Nepal ’,
in Dhruba Kumar (ed.), Domestic
Conflict and Crisis of Governability in Nepal ,
Kathmandu : CNAS (2000), pp. 135-162.
- Burghart, Richard, The Conditions of Listening. Essays on
Religion, History and Politics in South Asia , edited by
C.J. Fuller and J. Spencer, Delhi :
Oxford University Press (1996).
- Jaffrelot, C., The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India ,
New Delhi : Viking Penguin India
(1996).
- Van der Veer, Peter, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in
India , Berkeley : University
of California Press (1994).