The US's presumed right to impose its will on the world, by force if necessary, has not changed. But its capacity to do so has
By Noam Chomsky
In the years of conscious, self-inflicted decline at home, "losses"
continued to mount elsewhere. In the past decade, for the first time in
500 years, South America has taken successful steps to free itself from
western domination, another serious loss. The region has moved towards
integration, and has begun to address some of the terrible internal
problems of societies ruled by mostly Europeanized elites, tiny islands
of extreme wealth in a sea of misery. They have also rid themselves of
all US military bases and of IMF controls. A newly formed organization, CELAC,
includes all countries of the hemisphere apart from the US and Canada.
If it actually functions, that would be another step in American
decline, in this case in what has always been regarded as "the
backyard".
Even more serious would be the loss of the MENA
countries – Middle East/North Africa – which have been regarded by
planners since the 1940s as "a stupendous source of strategic power, and
one of the greatest material prizes in world history". Control of MENA
energy reserves would yield "substantial control of the world", in the
words of the influential Roosevelt advisor AA Berle.
To be sure, if the projections of a century of US energy independence based on North American energy resources
turn out to be realistic, the significance of controlling MENA would
decline somewhat, though probably not by much: the main concern has
always been control more than access. However, the likely consequences
to the planet's equilibrium are so ominous that discussion may be
largely an academic exercise.
The Arab Spring, another development
of historic importance, might portend at least a partial "loss" of
MENA. The US and its allies have tried hard to prevent that outcome – so
far, with considerable success. Their policy towards the popular
uprisings has kept closely to the standard guidelines: support the forces most amenable to US influence and control.
Favored
dictators are supported as long as they can maintain control (as in the
major oil states). When that is no longer possible, then discard them
and try to restore the old regime as fully as possible (as in Tunisia
and Egypt). The general pattern is familiar: Somoza, Marcos, Duvalier,
Mobutu, Suharto, and many others. In one case, Libya, the three
traditional imperial powers intervened by force to participate in a
rebellion to overthrow a mercurial and unreliable dictator, opening the
way, it is expected, to more efficient control over Libya's rich
resources (oil, primarily, but also water, of particular interest to
French corporations), to a possible base for the US Africa Command (so
far, restricted to Germany), and to the reversal of growing Chinese penetration. As far as policy goes, there have been few surprises.
Crucially,
it is important to reduce the threat of functioning democracy, in which
popular opinion will significantly influence policy. That, again, is
routine, and quite understandable. A look at the studies of public opinion undertaken by US polling agencies
in the MENA countries easily explains the western fear of authentic
democracy, in which public opinion will significantly influence policy.
Israel and the Republican party
Similar considerations carry over directly to the second major concern addressed in the issue of Foreign Affairs cited in part one of this piece:
the Israel-Palestine conflict. Fear of democracy could hardly be more
clearly exhibited than in this case. In January 2006, an election took
place in Palestine, pronounced free and fair by international monitors.
The instant reaction of the US (and, of course, Israel), with Europe
following along politely, was to impose harsh penalties on Palestinians
for voting the wrong way.
That is no innovation. It is quite in
accord with the general and unsurprising principle recognized by
mainstream scholarship: the US supports democracy if, and only if, the
outcomes accord with its strategic and economic objectives, the rueful
conclusion of neo-Reaganite Thomas Carothers, the most careful and
respected scholarly analyst of "democracy promotion" initiatives.
More
broadly, for 35 years, the US has led the rejectionist camp on
Israel-Palestine, blocking an international consensus calling for a
political settlement in terms too well known to require repetition. The
western mantra is that Israel seeks negotiations without preconditions,
while the Palestinians refuse. The opposite is more accurate. The US and
Israel demand strict preconditions, which are, furthermore, designed to
ensure that negotiations will lead either to Palestinian capitulation
on crucial issues or nowhere.
The first precondition is that the
negotiations must be supervised by Washington, which makes about as much
sense as demanding that Iran
supervise the negotiation of Sunni-Shia conflicts in Iraq. Serious
negotiations would have to be under the auspices of some neutral party,
preferably one that commands some international respect, perhaps Brazil.
The negotiations would seek to resolve the conflicts between the two
antagonists: the US-Israel on one side, most of the world on the other.
The
second precondition is that Israel must be free to expand its illegal
settlements in the West Bank. Theoretically, the US opposes these
actions, but with a very light tap on the wrist, while continuing to
provide economic, diplomatic, and military support. When the US does
have some limited objections, it very easily bars the actions, as in the
case of the E-1 project linking Greater Jerusalem to the town of
Ma'aleh Adumim, virtually bisecting the West Bank – a very high priority
for Israeli planners (across the spectrum), but raising some objections
in Washington, so that Israel has had to resort to devious measures to
chip away at the project.
The pretense of opposition reached the level of farce last February when Obama vetoed a UN security council resolution
calling for implementation of official US policy (also adding the
uncontroversial observation that the settlements themselves are illegal,
quite apart from expansion). Since that time, there has been little
talk about ending settlement expansion, which continues with studied
provocation.
Thus, as Israeli and Palestinian representatives prepared to meet in Jordan in January 2011, Israel announced new construction
in Pisgat Ze'ev and Har Homa, West Bank areas that it has declared to
be within the greatly expanded area of Jerusalem, annexed, settled, and
constructed as Israel's capital, all in violation of direct security
council orders. Other moves carry forward the grander design of
separating whatever West Bank enclaves will be left to Palestinian
administration from the cultural, commercial, political center of
Palestinian life in the former Jerusalem.
It is understandable
that Palestinian rights should be marginalized in US policy and
discourse. Palestinians have no wealth or power. They offer virtually
nothing to US policy concerns; in fact, they have negative value, as a
nuisance that stirs up "the Arab street".
Israel, in contrast, is a
valuable ally. It is a rich society with a sophisticated, largely
militarized, high-tech industry. For decades, it has been a highly
valued military and strategic ally, particularly since 1967, when it
performed a great service to the US and its Saudi ally by destroying the
Nasserite "virus", establishing the "special relationship" with
Washington in the form that has persisted since. It is also a growing
center for US high-tech investment. In fact, high tech and,
particularly, military industries in the two countries are closely
linked.
Apart from such elementary considerations of great power
politics as these, there are cultural factors that should not be
ignored. Christian Zionism in Britain and the US long preceded Jewish
Zionism, and has been a significant elite phenomenon with clear policy
implications (including the Balfour Declaration, which drew from it).
When General Allenby conquered Jerusalem during the first world war, he
was hailed in the American press as Richard the Lion-Hearted, who had at
last won the Crusades and driven the pagans out of the Holy Land.
The
next step was for the Chosen People to return to the land promised to
them by the Lord. Articulating a common elite view, President Franklin
Roosevelt's secretary of the interior, Harold Ickes, described Jewish
colonization of Palestine as an achievement "without comparison in the
history of the human race". Such attitudes find their place easily
within the providentialist doctrines that have been a strong element in
popular and elite culture since the country's origins: the belief that
God has a plan for the world and the US is carrying it forward under
divine guidance, as articulated by a long list of leading figures.
Moreover,
evangelical Christianity is a major popular force in the US. Further
toward the extremes, End Times evangelical Christianity also has
enormous popular outreach, invigorated by the establishment of Israel in
1948, revitalized even more by the conquest of the rest of Palestine in
1967 – all signs that End Times and the Second Coming are approaching.
These
forces have become particularly significant since the Reagan years, as
the Republicans have abandoned the pretence of being a political party
in the traditional sense, while devoting themselves in virtual lockstep
uniformity to servicing a tiny percentage of the super-rich and the
corporate sector. However, the small constituency that is primarily
served by the reconstructed party cannot provide votes, so they have to
turn elsewhere.
The only choice is to mobilize tendencies that
have always been present, though rarely as an organized political force:
primarily nativists trembling in fear and hatred, and religious
elements that are extremists by international standards but not in the
US. One outcome is reverence for alleged Biblical prophecies, hence not
only support for Israel and its conquests and expansion, but passionate
love for Israel, another core part of the catechism that must be intoned
by Republican candidates – with Democrats, again, not too far behind.
These
factors aside, it should not be forgotten that the "Anglosphere" –
Britain and its offshoots – consists of settler-colonial societies,
which rose on the ashes of indigenous populations, suppressed or
virtually exterminated. Past practices must have been basically correct,
in the US case, even ordained by Divine Providence. Accordingly, there
is often an intuitive sympathy for the children of Israel when they
follow a similar course. But primarily, geostrategic and economic
interests prevail, and policy is not graven in stone.
The Iranian "threat" and the nuclear issue
Let
us turn finally to the third of the leading issue addressed in the
establishment journals cited earlier, the "threat of Iran". Among elites
and the political class, this is generally taken to be the primary
threat to world order – though not among populations. In Europe, polls
show that Israel is regarded as the leading threat to peace. In the MENA
countries, that status is shared with the US, to the extent that in
Egypt, on the eve of the Tahrir Square uprising, 80% felt that the
region would be more secure if Iran had nuclear weapons. The same polls found that only 10% regard Iran as a threat – unlike the ruling dictators, who have their own concerns.
In the United States,
before the massive propaganda campaigns of the past few years, a
majority of the population agreed with most of the world that, as a
signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has a right to carry out
uranium enrichment. And even today, a large majority favors peaceful
means for dealing with Iran. There is even strong opposition to military
engagement if Iran and Israel are at war. Only a quarter regard Iran as
an important concern for the US altogether. But it is not unusual for
there to be a gap, often a chasm, dividing public opinion and policy.
Why
exactly is Iran regarded as such a colossal threat? The question is
rarely discussed, but it is not hard to find a serious answer – though
not, as usual, in the fevered pronouncements. The most authoritative
answer is provided by the Pentagon and the intelligence services in
their regular reports to Congress on global security. They report that
Iran does not pose a military threat. Its military spending is very low
even by the standards of the region, minuscule, of course, in comparison with the US.
Iran
has little capacity to deploy force. Its strategic doctrines are
defensive, designed to deter invasion long enough for diplomacy to set
it. If Iran is developing nuclear weapons capability, they report, that
would be part of its deterrence strategy. No serious analyst believes
that the ruling clerics are eager to see their country and possessions
vaporized, the immediate consequence of their coming even close to
initiating a nuclear war. And it is hardly necessary to spell out the reasons why any Iranian leadership would be concerned with deterrence, under existing circumstances.
The
regime is doubtless a serious threat to much of its own population –
and regrettably, is hardly unique on that score. But the primary threat
to the US and Israel is that Iran might deter their free exercise of
violence. A further threat is that the Iranians clearly seek to extend
their influence to neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan, and beyond, as
well. Those "illegitimate" acts are called "destabilizing" (or worse).
In contrast, forceful imposition of US influence halfway around the
world contributes to "stability" and order, in accord with traditional
doctrine about who owns the world.
It
makes very good sense to try to prevent Iran from joining the nuclear
weapons states, including the three that have refused to sign the
Non-Proliferation Treaty – Israel, India, and Pakistan,
all of which have been assisted in developing nuclear weapons by the
US, and are still being assisted by them. It is not impossible to
approach that goal by peaceful diplomatic means. One approach, which
enjoys overwhelming international support, is to undertake meaningful
steps towards establishing a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle
East, including Iran and Israel (and applying as well to US forces
deployed there), better still extending to South Asia.
Support for such efforts is so strong that the Obama administration
has been compelled to formally agree, but with reservations: crucially,
that Israel's nuclear program must not be placed under the auspices of
the International Atomic Energy Association, and that no state (meaning
the US) should be required to release information about "Israeli nuclear
facilities and activities, including information pertaining to previous
nuclear transfers to Israel". Obama also accepts Israel's position that
any such proposal must be conditional on a comprehensive peace
settlement, which the US and Israel can continue to delay indefinitely.
This survey comes nowhere near being exhaustive, needless to say. Among major topics not addressed is the shift
of US military policy towards the Asia-Pacific region, with new
additions to the huge military base system underway right now, in Jeju Island off South Korea and Northwest Australia, all elements of the policy of "containment of China". Closely related is the issue of US bases in Okinawa, bitterly opposed by the population for many years, and a continual crisis in US-Tokyo-Okinawa relations.
Revealing
how little fundamental assumptions have changed, US strategic analysts
describe the result of China's military programs as a "classic 'security
dilemma', whereby military programs and national strategies deemed
defensive by their planners are viewed as threatening by the other
side", writes Paul Godwin of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The
security dilemma arises over control of the seas off China's coasts. The
US regards its policies of controlling these waters as "defensive",
while China regards them as threatening; correspondingly, China regards
its actions in nearby areas as "defensive", while the US regards them as
threatening. No such debate is even imaginable concerning US coastal
waters. This "classic security dilemma" makes sense, again, on the
assumption that the US has a right to control most of the world, and
that US security requires something approaching absolute global control.
While
the principles of imperial domination have undergone little change, the
capacity to implement them has markedly declined as power has become
more broadly distributed in a diversifying world. Consequences are many.
It is, however, very important to bear in mind that, unfortunately,
none lifts the two dark clouds that hover over all consideration of
global order: nuclear war and environmental catastrophe, both literally
threatening the decent survival of the species.
Quite the contrary. Both threats are ominous, and increasing.
