December 18, 2011

IRAQ, A WAR OBAMA DIDN’T WANT, SHAPED HIS FOREIGN POLICY

[It has also shifted the balance of power in Washington, from the military commanders, who were desperate to leave a residual force of soldiers in Iraq, toward Mr. Obama’s civilian advisers, who are busy calculating how getting them all home by Christmas might help their boss’s re-election bid.]


By Mark Landler
Doug Mills/The New York Times
President Obama, at Fort Bragg, N.C., on Wednesday, welcomed
troops home from Iraq. The end of the war in Iraq will also
influence the end of operations in Afghanistan.
WASHINGTON — President Obama has made good on his campaign pledge to end the Iraq war, portraying the departure of the last troops as a chance to turn to nation-building at home.
But from Afghanistan to the Arab Spring, from China to counterterrorism, the lessons of that war still hang over the administration’s foreign policy — shaping, and sometimes limiting, how the president projects American power in the world.
The war that Mr. Obama never wanted to fight has weighed on internal debates, dictated priorities and often narrowed options for the United States, according to current and former administration officials.
Most tangibly, the swift American drawdown in Iraq will influence how the United States handles the endgame in Afghanistan, where NATOforces have agreed to hand over security and pull out by 2014. The fact that the troops are leaving Iraq without a wholesale breakdown in security, some analysts said, may embolden a war-weary administration to move up the timetable for getting out of Afghanistan.
It has also shifted the balance of power in Washington, from the military commanders, who were desperate to leave a residual force of soldiers in Iraq, toward Mr. Obama’s civilian advisers, who are busy calculating how getting them all home by Christmas might help their boss’s re-election bid.
“There used to be a hot debate over even setting a timetable,” said Benjamin J. Rhodes, a deputy national security adviser. While he cautioned that Iraq is not a perfect precedent for Afghanistan, “there should be no doubt about our commitment to follow through on the timelines we set in Afghanistan,” he said.
Mr. Rhodes, who wrote Mr. Obama’s foreign policy speeches during his 2008 campaign, said Iraq was a “dramatically underrepresented element of the way in which people look at Obama’s foreign policy.” As a candidate whose opposition to the war helped define him, Mr. Rhodes said, “Senator Obama constructed an entire argument of foreign policy, based on Iraq.”
His argument had two central pillars: that Iraq had taken the United States’ eye off the real battle in Afghanistan, and that it had diminished the United States’ standing in the world. This led directly to two of the administration’s most significant foreign policy and national security projects: Mr. Obama’s lethal counterterrorism strategy and his recent series of diplomatic and military initiatives in Asia.
The drone strikes and commando raids that the president recently boasted had killed “22 out of 30 top Al Qaeda leaders,” including Osama bin Laden, were honed in the night raids by American troops on militants in Iraq.
Mr. Obama’s emphasis on restoring the United States’ place in Asia grew out of a post-Iraq “strategic rebalancing” pushed by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and the national security adviser, Thomas E. Donilon. The war, they contend, sucked American time and resources from other parts of the world, allowing China to expand its sway throughout much of the Pacific Rim.
In the early days of his presidency, as Mr. Obama weighed more troop deployments in Afghanistan, he was still heavily influenced by commanders like Gen. David H. Petraeus, who was fresh off his successful “surge” in Iraq and pressed for an ambitious counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
“Here was a general who, in Petraeus’s case, had turned around a situation dramatically in Iraq, and was offering to do it again,” said Bruce O. Riedel, who ran the White House’s initial policy review on Afghanistan.
By 2011, however, Mr. Obama had developed his own views about the use of military force. His reluctant intervention in Libya — only after receiving the imprimatur of the Arab League, and then with limited military engagement — bore the hallmarks of a post-Iraq operation. In Syria, where a dictator in the Baathist tradition of Saddam Hussein has killed his own people, the United States has not considered a no-fly zone, let alone broader military intervention.
“The larger legacy of Iraq was that the U.S. military cannot shape outcomes,” said Vali Nasr, a former senior adviser in the State Department. “That led to skittishness on our part about using the military.”
Mr. Obama made much of his commitment to a multilateral foreign policy, in contrast to President George W. Bush’s unilateral invasion of Iraq. That, his advisers say, grew out of a conviction the United States needed to work with others and forge consensus to restore its moral standing.
But it also reflects a sober economic reality: with more than $800 billion in costs from the Iraq war — and nearly $450 billion from Afghanistan — the United States can no longer afford another big, go-it-alone military campaign.
“The impulse toward multilateralism is more complicated,” said Dennis B. Ross, who until last month was one of Mr. Obama’s senior Middle East advisers. “There is a desire, understandably, for our actions to have greater legitimacy on the world stage. But there is also an interest in burden-sharing and sharing the cost as well.”
Some analysts argue that the administration’s multilateral approach owes less to Iraq than it does to traditional Democratic Party philosophy.
“No doubt, Iraq contributed to his view that we should wield power less, should not act without U.N. resolutions and multilateral support, and should try to ‘engage’ with hostile regimes, but I suspect the president held those views years earlier,” said Elliott Abrams, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who worked in the George W. Bush and Reagan administrations.
“That’s pretty standard stuff on the left,” he added. “Iraq made them more central to his actions as president, but I doubt it taught him much.”
The Bush administration had hoped that Iraq would be a catalyst for democratic change across the Arab world. But there is little evidence that Iraq prepared the United States for the political changes that swept over the Middle East and North Africa this spring, eight years after American troops toppled Mr. Hussein.
The Obama administration’s initial response to the upheaval in Egypt and elsewhere was halting, as it balanced its support for the protesters with its fear of losing strategic allies. Mr. Rhodes said Iraq’s legacy was visible in the administration’s insistence on homegrown, rather than externally imposed, democratic change. That is likely to mean coming to terms with rulers it views as less than ideal, like the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties, which made striking gains in Egypt’s recent parliamentary elections.
“Iraq has taught us we can live with Islamists,” Mr. Nasr said. “We can live with a Maliki in Egypt,” he said, referring to Iraq’s Shiite prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. “Iraq exorcised the way we latched on to secular dictators.


@ The New York Times

REPRESSING DEMOCRACY, WITH AMERICAN ARMS

[Skirmishes break out almost daily in the neighborhood, with the police firing tear gas for offenses as trivial as honking to the tune of “Down, Down, Hamad.” Disproportionately often, those tear gas shells seem aimed at Ali’s house. Once, Jawad says, a shell was fired into the house through the front door. A couple of weeks ago, riot policemen barged into the house and ripped photos of Ali from the wall, said the boy’s mother, Maryam Abdulla.]

By Nicholas D. Kristof
SITRA, Bahrain WHEN President Obama decides soon whether to approve a $53 million arms sale to our close but despotic ally Bahrain, he must weigh the fact that America has a major naval base here and that Bahrain is a moderate, modernizing bulwark against Iran.
Yet he should also understand the systematic, violent repression here, the kind that apparently killed a 14-year-old boy, Ali al-Sheikh, and continues to torment his family.
Ali grew up here in Sitra, a collection of poor villages far from the gleaming bank towers of Bahrain’s skyline. Almost every day pro-democracy protests still bubble up in Sitra, and even when they are completely peaceful they are crushed with a barrage of American-made tear gas.
People here admire much about America and welcomed me into their homes, but there is also anger that the tear gas shells that they sweep off the streets each morning are made by a Pennsylvania company, NonLethal Technologies. It is a private company that declined to comment, but the American government grants it a license for these exports — and every shell fired undermines our image.
In August, Ali joined one of the protests. A policeman fired a shell at Ali from less than 15 feet away, according to the account of the family and human-rights groups. The shell apparently hit the boy in the back of the neck, and he died almost immediately, a couple of minutes’ walk from his home.
The government claims that the bruise was “inconsistent” with a blow from a tear gas grenade. Frankly, I’ve seen the Bahrain authorities lie so much that I don’t credit their denial.
Jawad al-Sheikh, Ali’s father, says that at the hospital, the government tried to force him to sign papers saying Ali had not been killed by the police.
King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa has recently distanced himself from the killings and torture, while pledging that Bahrain will reform. There have indeed been modest signs of improvement, and a member of the royal family, Saqer al-Khalifa, told me that progress will now be accelerated.
Yet despite the lofty rhetoric, the police have continued to persecute Ali’s family. For starters, riot policemen fired tear gas at the boy’s funeral, villagers say.
The police summoned Jawad for interrogation, most recently this month. He fears he will be fired from his job in the Ministry of Electricity.
Skirmishes break out almost daily in the neighborhood, with the police firing tear gas for offenses as trivial as honking to the tune of “Down, Down, Hamad.” Disproportionately often, those tear gas shells seem aimed at Ali’s house. Once, Jawad says, a shell was fired into the house through the front door. A couple of weeks ago, riot policemen barged into the house and ripped photos of Ali from the wall, said the boy’s mother, Maryam Abdulla.
“They’re worried about their throne,” she added, “so they want us to live in fear.”
Mourners regularly leave flowers and photos of Ali on his grave, which is in a vacant lot near the home. Perhaps because some messages call him a martyr, the riot police come regularly and smash the pictures and throw away the flowers. The family has not purchased a headstone yet, for fear that the police will destroy it.
The repression is ubiquitous. Consider Zainab al-Khawaja, 28, whose husband and father are both in prison and have been tortured for pro-democracy activities, according to human rights reports. Police officers have threatened to cut off Khawaja’s tongue, she told me, and they broke her father’s heart by falsely telling him that she had been shipped to Saudi Arabia to be raped and tortured. She braved the risks by talking to me about this last week — before she was arrested too.
Khawaja earned her college degree in Wisconsin. She has read deeply of Gandhi and of Gene Sharp, an American scholar who writes about how to use nonviolent protest to overthrow dictators. She was sitting peacefully protesting in a traffic circle when the police attacked her. First they fired tear gas grenades next to her, and then handcuffed her and dragged her away — sometimes slapping and hitting her as video cameras rolled. The Bahrain Center for Human Rights says that she was beaten more at the police station.
Khawaja is tough as nails, and when we walked alongside demonstrations together, she seemed unbothered by tear gas that left me blinded and coughing. But she worried about her 2-year-old daughter, Jude. And one time as we were driving back from visiting a family whose baby had just died, possibly because so much tear gas had been fired in the neighborhood, Khawaja began crying. “I think I’m losing it,” she said. “It all just gets to me.”
Since the government has now silenced her by putting her in jail, I’ll give her the last word. I asked her a few days before her arrest about the proposed American arms sale to Bahrain.
“At least don’t sell them arms,” she pleaded. “When Obama sells arms to dictators repressing people seeking democracy, he ruins the reputation of America. It’s never in America’s interest to turn a whole people against it.”

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