September 14, 2010


[Effective globalization calls forth effective localization—or ‘glocalization’-- so that one can truly ‘think global and act local’. This is why the 4P model—rather than the 3P--  is suggested. The very complexity of the globalization process with its byproduct- constant crises-- makes it imperative to adopt a bottom up, participative, dynamic approach to economic diplomacy as foreign affairs concerns all citizens at home.  (Also please see the author's another paper titled : Provoking Debate And Dialogue On Economics In The National Interest)]
By Madhukar Shumshere JB Rana
Professor, South Asian Institute of Management
Former Finance Minister of Nepal
Background:  Economist and Manageemnt Guru, Lester Thurow, and historians Paul Kennedy, Jeffrey Garton and Edward Luttwak  are, to my mind,  the intellectual leaders on the phenomena of globalization. It was conceived by them at the end of the '80s and the beginning of the '90s. I am happy to say that we, in Nepal, was perhaps the first amongst South Asian nations that introduced this as a foregn policy paradigm as early as 1996. Not bad, indeed. Full honours must go to the then Foreign Minister, Dr. Prakash Chandra Lohani for this vision. 

Globalization is well addressed by the MOFA’s landmark HLTF Study On Economic Diplomacy. After much hiccup, that lasted perhaps for nealry 6 years, it has obtained universal acceptance in the foreign policy paradign of Nepal.

Despite the above stated intellectual tradition, the fact remains that it was Japan and the East Asian Tigers that knew, all along-- albeit it intuitively, that statecraft deviod of economic-crafting could not empower nations: they correctly foresaw that what matters most, in post-World War II global affairs, is the economic weight of nations and not military might. 

Japan and Germany, even though they lost the Second World War, quickly came back to the centre of world politics precisely because of economic diplomacy. Then, subsequently, resultant from the brilliance and froesight of Asian statesmen like Japan’s PM Hayato Ikeda; South Korea’s President Pak Chung Hee; Singapore’s PM Lew and Malaysia’s PM Mohamed Mahatir we are richly endowed with an Asian perspective to comprehending the globalization phenomenon of the 20th century, which is likely to rage on well into the 21st century with a distinctly Asian ethos.

Lester Thurow believes that, in 50 yrs from now, we won’t be saying that we work in an Amercain, Chinese, Indian, Japan, European or Nepalese economy –but simply say “ we work in the global economy”.

Meaning of Diplomacy and Economic Diplomacy:

R. P. Barston (2006) defines diplomacy thus: “Diplomacy is concerned with the management of relations between states and between sates and other actors”. By this definition we may define ‘economic diplomacy’ as being concerned with the management of economic relations between states and between states and other non-state actors.

It is a process concerned with the design, development and application of economic policy to secure national interest. It’s the application of economic ‘weapons’, so to speak, to achieve national goals through peaceful negotiations. In globalization-speak, it may be called ‘war by other means’. 

Economic diplomacy is multi-layered in scope. It involves the art and science of negotiations ranging from bilateralism to sub-regionalism, regionalism; and also inter-regionalism to multilateralism and plurilateralism.

If in the 18th and 19th century globalization, nations in a multi-polar world sought military alliances we may expect that, in the 21st century, it will be strategic partnerships in the manner of economic alliances that will be a diplomatic commonplace. 

Nature and Scope of the New Economic Diploamcy: 

Economic diplomacy in the 21st century is going to be a new reality in terms of its relative complexities where economic, fianancial and ecological crises are going to be a constant. We know that crisis-ridden complexities create immnese challenges as states seek to defend, advance or promote national interests. These challeneges concern issues ranging from communciation, control, coordination, command  driven by an environment of intense competiton and conflcit. Hence ‘national secuirty’ assumes a special place.

Turbulence is the probable environment in which diplomatic games have to be played out. In such an environment, econcomic diplomacy has to be strategically planned and managed with well conceived national vision, mision and goals—and with a foused foreign economic strategy in place targeting chosen countries.

As a part and parcel of the national resource mobilization strategy it is now required that, along with mobilization and developemnt of finacial and human resources, we make maximum use of modern information and communcation technology (ICT). Required for success are strong, stable national instituions competently manned with exectuives who comprehend the national startegy and are committed to the national mission. It requires that all key pol;iticians, bureaucrats and judges be familiar with what Nepal’s comparative and competitve advantages are and can be.  Not least, fuly abret of the national security issues.  

Because of the fragility and turbulence of the global  economic and social environment economic diplomacy, as a concept, should be broadened in its scope to incorporate ‘economic security’—food, water, energy, environemt, employemnt -- as an integral part of what is being called herein as ‘new (21st  century) economic diplomacy’. 

It needs be underscoring here that the definition of ‘economic diplomacy’, being offered,  is more than simply a means to securing national economics gains. Here it is defined to encompass national interest and national secuity as its raison d'etre as economic froces have to be judiciously used and developed to safeguard Nepal’s national sovereignty, independence and terrirotral integrity. 

To repeat, this much wider definition is being offered here because it is vitally essential to understand that three tensions marks economic diplomacy, namely (1) tension between economics and politics (2) tension between public and private spheres and (3) tension between domestic and international. Only by being cognizant of national secuity interests can we resolve these tensions-- and that too only by plannng and managing strategically.   

The 1996 HLTF Study chose aid, trade, tourism, laour, foreign investment and water resources as the parameters to incrporate in the eoconomic diplomacy process for Nepal. People often ask me why water?

Let me quote our foremost water expert, Dipak Gyawali: around water are plenty of disputed issues but they cannot be resolved by military means; and diplomacy is the proper manner in which water problems can be resolved but it requires in-depth and interdisciplinary understanding of water issues”. Forestry too can be a candidate. But for this, it needs to be highly commercialized. 

Bill Clinton is said to be the first US President to link foreign policy to domestic economy, and jobs at home, through the relentless pursuit of the interests of corporate America –especially its banks and financial institutions.  He understood globalization like no other before him.

We may expect President Obama to move beyond Clinton with much vigour and depth. He needs it more politically and psychologically as he is fighting 2 military wars -- unlike Clinton. Some might even say 3 ‘wars’ given the ecological disaster with the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.


To be efficiently and effectively practical, one needs to have a clear, crip and common conceptual concept of what economic diplomacy is in the geo-political, geo-economic and geo-psychological context of Nepal. To repeat, this is best achieved by the process of strategic palnning and management.

All ministries resposnible for economic diplomacy must be professionally sound in economics and business value chain analysis. In this way they can be as practicle as possible, namely by being aware of costs, benefits and returns on investments--- as well as being aware of the flow of goods and servcies from the farm’s/firm’s gate to the international retail markets as these are the determing forces for global competitiveness. 

Economic diplomacy takes one style under the market capitalsim of the West; another style under the state capitalism of China, and yet one more style in the semi-market capitalistic regimes of India and Nepal. Hence we tend to find greater coherence in economic diplomacy under state capitalism than say finance capitalism (bank-led) and merchant capitalism (trade-led). 

Another fundamental requirement for ‘practical economic diplomacy’ is to be clear on the buisness model to be used for economic diplomacy. Such  a model is framed in the conetxt of a nation’s resources, institutional competency, opportunties and threats; and usually spelt out, for execution, in (a) a  macro-type Strategic Management Plan by the NPC; and (b) duly operationalized in the form of the meso-type Annual Action Plan by the MOFA and, then, (c) broken down into micro- type Annual Business Plans by and for each mission abroad. 

The third, and final, fundamental is to adopt the right decsion-making and coordinating processes for economic diplomacy planning, execution, monitoring and evaluation with clear cut identification of role, responsibility and accountability for results by the primary actors in the process.

There are many managerial process models for economic diploamcy. There is (a) the ‘unified model’ as in Australasia, Canada, New Zealand and Sweden where trade and invetsment are toally merged with foreign affairs – but executed by separate cadres in the  civil service; (b) the ‘partial unfication model’, as in UK, where the same cadre conducts two separate polcieis – foreign policy combined with trade-invetsment policies; (c) the ‘separation model’ as in Singapore where foreign policy is the domain of the civil service but trade and invetsment mattres are excuted by the autonoumous public service Boards and (d) the traditional ‘competition model’, as prevails in Nepal, India and all SAARC nations, and also Thailand; where there is intense bureaucratic turf battles over careers, powers,  prestige and pelf.

The Recommendations by the 1996 HLTF, and the subsequent 1998 HLTF Implementation Report, sought to devise a PPP model given the reality of bureaucratic turf wars; its subtarranean conflicts, and dysfunctional competition by accenting heavily on leadership; action planning; coordination; communication, monitoring and professionalism in the civil service. That basically is the rationale for the policy recommendations of 1996. While the 1998 recommendations focussd on  putting the decision process into motion given the chosen structures and aims for economic diplomacy.

It even recommended a decentralized, non-uniform model for the missions. For example, for India it recommended that maximum use be made of the research organizations and agents to help devise an India-specific economic diplomacy strategy-- particularly concentrating on the immediate neighbourhood and the entrepreneurial spirit amongst the 8-10 million Nepali diasporas in India.

Also, that in the Arab world, local staff could be used to the maximum to deal with language, cultural and social problems faced by the NRNs there.

Let us underscore hear that, overall, the strategic model envisaged in 1996 is one that is state-led (as in the East Asian nations) and not market led—precisely because we lack  our own banks and MNCs abroad as overseas market players. 

No doubt all the Report commissioned post 2000 sough to improve upon the HLTF’s set of recommendations by, basically, underscoring the need to deal with the immediate constraint in the wake of the institutional and financial limitations.

However, all these reports missed making references to the highly comprehensive 1998 Report provide to the MOFA entitled “Implementing the HLTF Study’s Recommendation” by this author.

This Report was geared to institution development of the MOFA as an organization truly fit to play the lead role in economic diplomacy. It was preoccupied  with how the MOFA and its missions could coordinate effectively with all economic ministries on a day-to-day basis at executive and operational levels; and also how economics and politics could be harmonized through the innovations of regional Divisions in the MOFA.

Unfortunately, the MOFA failed to move the process forward although it was given an excellent, dynamic start by Foreign Secretary, Kedar Bhakta Shrestha supported by a very able and innovative Joint Secretary, Prabal SJB Rana, as Head of the ECRD Division.

It required structural changes to effectively institutionalize it, which it could not manage to sustain with the change in leadership in the MOFA. The MOFA tampered with various ad hoc ‘innovations’ while dropping those already begun (i.e. International Business Forum created in the sprit of public-private partnership; International Relations Desks in all ministries with a Joint Secretary held responsible for coordination and thus practically killing the concept into a rhetorical ghost.                

Critical Weakness in Practice of Economic Diplomacy:

There is a near total void in political and bureacratic leaderships to strategize and execute economic diplomacy.

Inability to manage change in the bureaucracy has mean that the process, methods and techniques have remained undermanaged and ill-led.

The gross lack of competency development in the MOFA to manage the complex process and to be able to negotiate and coordinate with the related minsitries who felt their turf was being invaded by MOFA.

Political and bureaucratic instability and the near-total lack of  a business and managerial culture in the national bureaucracy.

Absence of a technocracy in the civil service to have the capacity to steer the public institutions in the wake of crises, conflicts and insurgencies and political voids. They failed to counterbalance poor politics with good economics, as it were. This positive phenomeon did prevail during the period 1996-2000 as a result of the solid pressures and incentives that the World Bank placed on Nepal.

Especially noteworthy was the active role played by the then WB Country Director, Kenichi Ohashi. Alas all could not be  sustained. In the fraework of policies, Nepal was more a case where foreign relations dominated national politics rather than foreign policy being a reflection of national needs and realities.

Aid colonization that refuses to entertian local innovations.

The 25 Practical Strategic Recommendations:  

One: Recreate the Economic Relations and Coordination Division (ERCD) as originally envisioned with its role as follows: (1)  to contribute to the integration of national economic policies into Nepal’s foreign policy goals and strategies; (2) to develop a sense of full partnership with the sectoral ministries and the private sector in the conduct of economic diplomacy; (3) to support planning and organizing of all the commercial functions and activities to be undertaken by the missions; (4) to monitor and facilitate the aid management and business promotion activities being carried out in Nepal by donor countries and international organizations; (5)  to help strengthen the bilateral Joint Economic Commission and identify opportunities for regional and sub-regional cooperation; and (6) to facilitate vertical and horizontal coordination of economic diplomacy function being executed by the diverse economic decision making centers, including INGOs and NGOs.

Two: The ERCD should be headed by a Special Secretary, Economic Affairs, and assisted by a team of five Economic Affairs Officers working on a group of related sectors as follows: (1) transport, communications, power, construction and urban development ; (2) agriculture, forestry, natural resources, rural and urban affairs (3) industry, commerce, supplies and tourism ; social development and human resource development and (4) investments, macro-economic, capital, commodities and informal markets. (Revisit JD for the ERCD/MOFA-- as provide by Implementation Report by this author, while he served as Special Advisor to MOFA from 1996-98) .  

Three: The transfer of the MOF’s aid coordination division—at least for the bilateral relations-- will ease the problem of a lack of manpower and quickly put an end to the lapse in the pursuit of protocol by Ambassadors and Embassies in situ contrary to international laws.

Four: Further, draw up on the human resources of the Trade Promotion Board, National Productivity Council etc--- all lying underutilized and near defunct functionally to assist the ERCD/MOFA.

Five: Recreate the International Business Forum and pursue the TOR as laid down in HTF Report 1996; HTF Implementation Report 1998 and also the IFA Report 2002

Six: Needed now is a 15-20 year Perspective Industrial Plan based on, and integrated with, the Water and Energy Plan – not based on past industrial trends. The targeted mid- and long- term GDPs should be derived from such a plan by the National Development Council and National Planning Commission.

Seven: Establish a Perspective Planning Board where a special group of independent national experts are appointed by the Constituent Assembly to complete this task by 2.5 years of its creation.

Eight: Ad interim have the NPC provide the concerned ministries with the Economic Diplomacy Annual Action Plan with clear cut targets for all the parameters.    

Nine: Implement the JD for Economic Minister Counsellors and develop a JD for Labour Counsellors.

Ten: Require all Ambassadors to formulate their Annual Business Plan in consultation with MOFA and other relevant ministries.     

Eleven: As no change is possible without firm and committed executive leadership so, therefore, an interested and competent Foreign Minister is sorely needed -- along with a Foreign Secretary, who will remain  on the job for 5-8 years to build the MOFA as an institution fit for economic diplomacy. Institutional support be garnered from the IFA and NAASC. (Note: The position of  FM is generally conceived as a ‘loss’ job and so no one is really interested in the post as first choice!).

Twelve: MOFA must itself add value for others in the economic diplomacy process: this means it must be competent to formulate strategic plans integrating foreign policy with internal policies as well as contributing to formulation of sector policies with sound economic, security and diplomatic inputs from the missions (as more these from the ground data and information are current and assumes greater contemporary value for business decisions).

Thirteen: Maximize the ICT inputs in this Division along with its counterparts in related ministries, including NTB,  for horizontal coordination –in other words have an International Economic Relations Division in each ministry to liaise functionally with MOFA and to formulate the Annual Action Plan for Economic Diplomacy, which will guide the missions to formulate their own annual business plans and, in turn, fro them to feedback to the ministries on the ground realities and opportunities based on information derived from competitive conditions prevailing from other countries, especially those from South Asia with similar economies and similar export products and services.

Fourteen: Nepal Govt. contract out research and consultancy especially for organization development to, through IFA, to institutes like SWATEE, Sangam Institute, SAIM, IIDS; MAN, Nepal Tourism Board, Water Resource Commission, Association of Former Ambassadors etc .  

Fifteen: Appoint a top level international consultant to devise institutional and electronic mechanisms to integrate economic diplomacy functions between MOFA and Missions; band between and with Ministries to create a paperless virtual world and to advance communication--- and horizontal coordination, which hardly exists in the national bureaucracy.

Sixteen: Support Nepal Tourism Board to Brand Nepal –just as has been achieved so successfully by Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Mauritius. Brand Human Rights was what Jimmy Carter achieved while Brand Democracy was achieved by Bush jr. Similarly, Incredible India is Brand India.

Although a China Brand has not developed, China’s foreign policy of the ‘harmonious world’, enunciated in 2005, is case of economic diplomacy by seeking to mould global affairs from the perspective (geo-psychology) of the developing world –not the developed. It emphasizes trade and not aid—indeed trade creating aid-- and for which it has earmarked $ 10 billion as soft, long term development loans for the so-called  ‘joint rise’ through to mutual prosperity projects.   

Seventeen: Mobilize the NRNs, including those in India, to be partners abroad in Nepal’s Economic Diplomacy drive. Mobilization may also be of the Nepali students to help Economic Counsellors by working as interns and volunteers in exchange for professional experience in diplomacy. These students can be used not just for operations but also applied research. It is commonly resorted to by Caribbean, European and Latin American nations, who also face severe budgetary handicaps. 

Eighteen: Incorporate into the Annual Budget an Integrated Performance Budget for Economic Diplomacy that is well targeted and focused on Outcomes. The Budget for Economic Diplomacy should be a product of the envisaged PPP process and duly endorsed by the Economic Committee of the Cabinet chaired by the Finance Minister.

Nineteen: Maximize participation in Trade, Tourism and Crafts Fairs

Twenty: Create regional economic diplomacy hubs to maximize impact and minimize expenses. For example, have New Delhi serve as hub for South Asia; Washington DC as hub for North America; Beijing as hub for East Asia and Australasia;  Malaysia as hub for South East Asia; Brussels for Europe; Johannesburg for  Sub-Saharian Africa and  Cairo as hub for North Africa and West Asia. Constant ICT interface between ‘hub missions’ and ‘spoke missions’ will add value to economic diplomacy as ground realities will be duly incorporated into national macro and sector policies as it is  based on first hand knowledge of local market, local  culture and local tastes--  as well as based on critical intelligence information on the competition from South Asian suppliers and elsewhere.  All regional ambassadors must be required to hold annual conferences led buy the hub ambassadors in cooperation with bilateral chambers to review progress; adjust tactics and exchange ides on opportunities and intelligence.     

Twenty One: Aggressively promote, in close partnership with leading business houses of Nepal, Nepali MNCs in Asia – construction; power generation; transportation; hotels and resorts; mineral water; breweries; alcohol and beverages; noodles; herbal products; banking and finance; security  We can even learn from the magnificent entrepreneurial spirit of Bhutan’s Tashi Group of Enterprises, which is now established in Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal.

Twenty Two: Top most priority be given to (a) attracting ‘sovereign individuals’ to visit Nepal and (b) negotiating strategic partnerships with Bangladesh, Chin and India and (c) advancing our role in the UN system and UNCTAD, ESCAP, BOA, APEC, ICIMOD, Oxfam; WTO; WEF; Doha Round Negotiations; (multilateral and bilateral) SAARC; SA-GQ; coalition building LLDC/Mountain Group in the UN General Assembly; Duty Free Access for key products to key markets in North America, Europe, Japan, Australasia, Korea and Thailand.    

Twenty Three: Set up the Economic Diplomacy Monitoring and Coordinating Committee, chaired by Chief Secretary with the Special Secretary, MOFA serving as its Member-Secretary, to meet every six months. And advise the Prime Minister.

Twenty Four: Given the vast increase in revenue mobilization and the scope for more efforts must now be madder to fully meet the budgetary needs of the MOFA to conduct diplomacy. Here the following should be noted: (a) in respect of economic diplomacy the private sector has already agreed to contribute finance and human capital –and they are ready to provide more based on the performance results for  service rendered to them by MOFA.; (b) shortfalls may be met by having MOFA sell its real estate in France, UK, Berne and, in turn, move to more commercially viable property and (c) allow MOFA to  take low interest long-term loans from ADB, WB etc to meet its infrastructure needs abroad fro economic diplomacy . The NRN Bonds may be mobilized for this purpose too.

Twenty Five: On the strategic partnership front more specifically: (a) Negotiate customs union with India with full freedom of movement for people (visa free), goods, technology, transport, capital and freedom of employment. (b) Sign an FTA with Bangladesh. and with India; (c) but with India ensure that it includes trade in services and investments, on the one hand, and, a PTA for trade in goods, on the other hand especially trade in agro-industrials. (d) Sign a PTA with China. (d) Negotiate free access for specific products  like garments, herb, coffee, tea, oil seeds, floriculture etc to North America, Japan, Korea and EU a per UNC|TAD principles of ‘special and differential treatment’ for the least developed and land/sea locked countries.  


Effective globalization calls forth effective localization—or ‘glocalization’-- so that one can truly ‘think global and act local’. This is why the 4P model—rather than the 3P--  is suggested. The very complexity of the globalization process with its byproduct- constant crises-- makes it imperative to adopt a bottom up, participative, dynamic approach to economic diplomacy as foreign affairs concerns all citizens at home.

Economic diplomacy must incorporate in its policy radar national security as there is another parallel globalization in effect – the black economy controlled by the mafia based on drugs, smuggling, money laundering and counterfeiting, prostitution and human trafficking, small arms trade etc.    

Nepal is heading—wrongly-- for a federal set up and that too with rights of self-determination! All the more, therefore, the bureaucracy takes the lead to ensure that economic diplomacy is well managed with maximum reliance on ICT to cope with challenges swiftly. A strong bureaucracy is a must to cope with the centrifugal forces of federalism so that all parts serve the national interest and guarantee national security.

Government can not govern without a bureaucracy. There can not be rule or law or justice without it. Strong, effective government is impossible without a strong, technocratic bureaucracy that functions as a ‘managerial civil service’, where the politics of governance is transformed into actions through managerial decisions. 

Politicians govern; bureaucrats manage/deliver results efficiently respecting the rule of law. Whereas politicians focus on the political energies of society by giving alternative ideological options to choose from, bureaucrats put to action the policies with due diligence to efficiency, productivity, social cost-benefit, sustainability and, not least, justice and equity. And all this is done by accounting for the use of tax payers’ money in a transparent manner. Technocrats and bureaucrats also have the knack to reconcile economic and politics.   

There has been, since 1990, systemic failure in diplomacy. Let me quote our candidate for the Presidency of the UN General Assembly, Kul Chandra Gautam, who said recently “Compared to many other developing countries, Nepal has also (presumably referring to the diplomatic failure on the Bhutanese Refugees Crisis) failed to be an influential player on issues of aid, trade and foreign direct investment in favour of countries like Nepal in multilateral development forums like the World Bank, IMF, WTO and UN agencies”.
Compare the above stated sorry state of diplomacy to the grand, far sighted multilateral achievements of King Birendra, from 1974- 1990.

On hindsight Nepal achieved  magnificent successes in the UN Security Council; UNCTAD; UN Peace Keeping Force; ICIMOD; UNESCO; mobilization of many UN and INGO regional offices in Kathmandu; started the SARC movement and established SAARC Secretariat in  Nepal; BAO; national parks and nature conservation; spreading RNAC’s wings to as far as Europe and Japan; obtaining the global status as the Emperor of all Hindus etc.

Even King Birendra’s visionary concept of Nepal as a ‘zone of peace’ had 116 countries backing it with the exception of India, which felt that it was a Royal ploy to get Nepal out of its exclusive sphere of interest and, thus, connived with, and convinced, the democratic party stalwarts in NC and UML-- that it was really a cunning Royal ploy to institutionalize the monarchical panchati raj for all times to come.

India went so far as to place a near year-long economic blockade on Nepal in 1989 to destabilize the royal regime because King Birendra’s refused to accept its newer version, submitted to him in 1989, for the revision of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship.

As the frustration, alienation and angst of the youth explode to support totalitarian doctrines it is because of the failure of democratic forces to inject hope, inspiration and social creativity towards new and appropriate social values, social relationships, social discipline and social empowerment--- and that too with apprenticeships, vocational, technical and technological skills- oriented education for productive jobs.

Our traditional society is eroding into anarchy. Everybody seeks concessions based on caste, creed, class, sex and age: everyone seeking inclusion not knowing into what structures at whose cost? Inclusion becomes a ‘loss-win’ game  in an economy that is  floundering. 

A dysfunctional society is the breeding ground for dictators –or foreign troops-- as people, after all, want peace, harmony, security and stability. Our democracy is being turned on its head with all manner of inclusion where the will of the minority is to prevail over the rights of majority. Obviously, this process will fall part in quick speed as  the majority perceives the reality of their loss of heritage and foreign forces start to calm down to support politics of inclusion.  

Finally, let’s recall that Kemal Attaturk took just 15 years, from 1923-38, to westernize the 400 year old Ottoman Caliphate of Turkey. Visionary leaders can transform societies. All we are asking for is to modernize our institutions –not westernize any.

With visionary leadership this transformation can be achieved in 5-7 years. For this purpose, the strategic recommendations made in the 1996 HLTF Report provided the vision that needs to be duly supported by strategic management plans. Otherwise, as the Japanese saying goes-- a vision without action is merely a dream: but action, without vision, can be a horrible nightmare. Swami Vivekananda when asked “what is worse than being blind”, he said “not having vision”.

To sum up-- the overarching, strategic intent of this Paper is this: Nepal’s future lies in industrialization grounded on agro-forestry, and on export of water, and import substitution of fossil fuels, as its land and location are, henceforth, its competitive advantage in the Globalization of the 21st century.


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The Hague, chapter 2, Negotiation behaviour through the centuries, pp 17-29

Rohitha Bogollagama, (2007); Minister of Foreign Affairs and Architect of Sri Lanka’s  policy of economic diplomacy

Michael Mastanduno (2001) Economic Engagement Strategies

Centre for Economic Diplomacy Studies; Tsingua University,China

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Dipak Gyawali (200 ); Basics of Nepal’s Hydro-Diplomacy

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Matrix For Economic Diplomacy Strategy Crafting
Conflict Cooperation Communication Coordination Competition Comprehension 

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UN Security Council
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Saarc Secretariat, Kathmandu
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