[How to handle the situation in Afghanistan, which was rarely discussed during the presidential campaign, looms as a major decision for Mr. Trump. In some respects, it is a liability for a president who has called for putting “America first.” Deploying more troops would cost billions of dollars, and there is no guarantee of a clear win. The United States failed to produce successful negotiations when it had 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, a poor country with little in the way of natural resources.]
By Michael R. Gordon
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Members
of the Marines and the Afghan National Army during a handover ceremony
last
month at Camp Leatherneck in Lashkar Gah, in the southern Afghan province of
Helmand.
American officials said that 3,000 to 5,000 more troops could be sent.
Credit
Wakil Kohsar/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
|
WASHINGTON
— Senior Trump
administration and military officials are recommending sending several thousand
additional American troops to Afghanistan to try to break a military deadlock
in the 15-year war there, in part by pressuring the Taliban to negotiate with
the Afghan government.
The added troops would allow American
advisers to work with a greater number of Afghan forces, and closer to the
front lines.
The recommendation, which has yet to be
approved by President Trump, is the product of a broad review by the Pentagon,
the State Department, intelligence community and other government agencies on
America’s longest war. It is broadly consistent with advice Gen. John W.
Nicholson, the top American commander in Afghanistan, gave Congress in
February.
Warning that the United States and its NATO
allies faced a “stalemate,” General Nicholson told lawmakers that he had a
shortfall of a “few thousand” troops and said more personnel would enable the
American military to advise the Afghan military more effectively and at lower
levels in the chain of command.
The international force assisting the Afghans
has about 13,000 troops, of whom about 8,400 are American.
American officials said that 3,000 to 5,000
additional troops, including hundreds of Special Operations forces, could be
sent. The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal
deliberations.
NATO nations would also be asked to send
thousands of troops, and the precise number of American forces deployed would
probably depend on what those allies were prepared to do.
Mr. Trump is expected to make a decision on
his Afghan strategy before a May 25 NATO meeting in Brussels. The
recommendation of his top advisers was first reported by The Washington Post.
How to handle the situation in Afghanistan,
which was rarely discussed during the presidential campaign, looms as a major
decision for Mr. Trump. In some respects, it is a liability for a president who
has called for putting “America first.” Deploying more troops would cost
billions of dollars, and there is no guarantee of a clear win. The United
States failed to produce successful negotiations when it had 100,000 troops in
Afghanistan, a poor country with little in the way of natural resources.
But without a strong American military role,
the Taliban and more extreme groups like the Islamic State’s Afghan wing would
most likely gain ground, weakening Mr. Trump’s vow to defeat Islamic
extremists. Pulling back would also put Mr. Trump at odds with generals whom he
embraced and turned to for national security advice.
The shift of strategy recommended by Mr.
Trump’s advisers reflects the assessment that a major new troop commitment —
like the 30,000-troop reinforcement President Barack Obama announced in
December 2009 — is undesirable and politically impossible. But it also reflects
the assumption that maintaining the current level of forces could leave the
United States presiding over a slow deterioration in security, with fading
hopes for a negotiated settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan
government.
One twist is that the new strategy would
dispense with the hard deadlines the Obama administration set, and was
sometimes forced to revise, for gradually withdrawing troops.
Many military officers have argued that
setting a public deadline for withdrawal is counterproductive because it allows
adversaries to wait out the American and NATO troop commitment instead of
forcing them to the negotiating table.
But Mr. Trump’s advisers do not want a new
American commitment to be open-ended, and they are suggesting that its duration
be dependent on steps by President Ashraf Ghani to fight corruption and appoint
more effective commanders.
Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, Mr. Trump’s national
security adviser, led an anticorruption task force in Afghanistan and is
especially sensitive to the need for better governing in Kabul. Jim Mattis, the
secretary of defense, also has extensive experience with Afghanistan, having
overseen the military effort there as head of the United States Central
Command.
The generals, however, are not the only ones
who favor a stronger commitment to Afghanistan. American intelligence officials
also want more support, calculating that a stronger military presence would
assist their intelligence efforts against extremist groups in Afghanistan and
neighboring Pakistan.
One issue that remains unclear is how the new
strategy would deal with the safe havens the Taliban and other militant groups
have in Pakistan.
General Nicholson acknowledged to Congress
that it was “very difficult to succeed on the battlefield when your enemy
enjoys external support and safe haven.” He urged “a holistic review” of
American policy toward Pakistan.
American forces have two basic missions in
Afghanistan: advising and training Afghan forces and conducting
counterterrorism missions, like a recent operation in which about 50 Army
Rangers and a similar number of Afghan commandos killed the leader of the
Afghan branch of the Islamic State.
General Nicholson told Congress the shortfall
was mainly in forces for training and advising the Afghans. Currently, advisers
are working with Afghans mostly at the command level of the army corps. But
more advisers, he said, would enable the American-led coalition to work at the
level of the Afghan brigades.
Military advisers are generally considered
more effective if they are not limited to advising foreign armies in their
headquarters, but extend to units in the field.
The Obama administration’s decision last
summer to give American commanders more flexibility to provide air support for
Afghan forces fighting the Taliban increased the need for advisers below the
level of the Afghan army corps, General Nicholson told Congress.
Eric Schmitt contributed reporting.